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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ESSAYS ON INNOVATION, ANALYST COVERAGE, AND 
CORPORATE FINANCE 
 by 
    Yang Liu 
 
 
Advisor: Professor Jun Wang 
This dissertation consists of three chapters that encompass corporate innovation, analyst 
coverage, public firm disclosure, and institutional investors. 
Chapter 1: A negative relation between analyst coverage and firm innovation is documented by 
prior literature. I complement this finding by showing that this negative effect is driven by firms 
with little past innovation experience. I find analysts have a positive effect on patent output for 
innovative firms. The potential mechanism behind the positive correlation between analyst 
coverage and firms’ innovation could be that the efficiency (measured by patent value) is much 
higher for firms with larger patent portfolios if they invest in R&D. This paper provides evidence 
that analysts have heterogeneous impact on different firms’ innovation. 
Chapter 2: Based on two quasi-natural experiments, I find that the informativeness of corporate 
disclosure increases in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), and the Risk Factor 
section of the 10-K reports, after the reduction of analyst coverage. Modification, document 
length and readability are three dimensions used to measure informativeness. My results show 
that disclosure informativeness and analyst coverage are complementary. The effects are more 
pronounced for firms with less analyst coverage. 
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Chapter 3 (joint with Jun Wang and Qijian Wang): We study the effects of passive institutional 
investors on corporate innovation. The existing literature has shown a negative relation between 
the two, and in some cases, no relation. When we apply the regression discontinuity design 
around the Russell 1000/2000 indexes reconstruction to come up with an exogenous variation of 
passive institutional investors, we find that more passive institutional investors bring more 
corporate innovations. In addition to the evidence that passive institutional investors bring better 
corporate governance practices, we show two more channels. Passive institutional investors 
reduce the overall CEO turnover probability and they are more discriminating in linking CEO 
turnover to relative performance. Passive institutional investors are associated with wide 
adoption of employee stock options and employee stock options foster innovation. 
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CHAPTER 1：Corporate Innovation and Analyst Following 
1. Introduction  
The growth of our economy is driven by innovation. A perfect financial market should be able to 
allocate resources to those firms with better innovation potential. How financial markets affect 
company innovation activities has been studied a great deal in recent years. Prior literature has 
shown financial markets exert opposite effects on a firm’s innovation. Aghion, Van Reenen, and 
Zingales (2013) showed that the existence of institutional investors can improve firms’ quantity 
and quality of innovation by alleviating CEO concerns. He and Tian (2013) show the pressure 
from analyst coverage leads to managerial myopia and impedes long-term innovation.  
Undoubtedly, innovation is essential for future corporate growth opportunities. Firms invest in 
research and development (R&D) as their long-term investment for intellectual property. Patents 
generated by firms are treated as the output of corporate innovation. Investment in innovative 
projects includes considerable fixed costs such as research experts and the required cutting-edge 
equipment. Hall and Lerner (2010) show that more than 50% of R&D spending is the wages and 
salaries of scientists and engineers. Firms who engage in innovative projects tend to smooth their 
R&D spending over time to get the benefit in the future. In fact, there are two distinct groups of 
firms existing simultaneously, the firms with little innovation experience and the firms with large 
patent pools. This paper shows that most patents are generated by a small fraction of firms. The 
research question in this paper focuses on how the financial market affects these two different 
groups of firms. Specifically, this paper studies the influence of sell-side analysts on corporate 
innovation output.  
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As important participants in the financial market, analysts can affect corporate financial 
decisions by providing their opinions about future performance of the firms they cover. First, 
analysts provide a better information environment for public firms and reduce the information 
asymmetry between investors and corporate insiders. For example, by using the same quasi-
natural experiments, Balakrishnan et al. (2014) show that the response of public firms to 
exogenous analyst coverage reduction is voluntarily disclosing more information than what 
regulations mandate. Information environment is essential for corporate financing, Derrien and 
Kecskes (2013) show the exogenous reduction of analyst coverage increases the cost of capital 
and thus decreases their future investment and financing. Information asymmetry is particularly 
severe in innovation activities because the process and future return is quite obscure for investors 
in the financial market. The second way that the analysts can affect corporate behavior is by 
monitoring public firms and preventing misconduct. Yu (2008) shows that firms followed by 
more analysts manage their earnings less. When the analyst coverage reduces exogenously, 
Chen, Harford and Lin (2015) show CEOs receive higher excess compensation and firms are 
more likely to make value-destroying investment. Bellstan, Bhagat and Cookson (2016) point out 
that analysts provide their opinion about technology and innovative activities in their analyst 
reports. As professional financial market participants, analysts should be more capable to 
monitor the firms’ innovative activities. However, on the other hand, the existence of analysts 
may lead to managerial myopia. Failing to meet analyst forecasts is treated as a negative signal 
in the financial market. In a survey done by Grahan, Harvey and Rajgopal (2002), CFOs are 
willing to sacrifice long-term investments to meet short-term earnings targets. As part of 
corporate long-term investment, innovation activities could be affected in this case. He and Tian 
(2013) show the negative correlation between analyst coverage and corporate innovation outputs. 
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In sum, analysts provide a better information environment, play monitoring roles, and exert 
pressure on firms to focus on short-term performance.  
This paper studies how analysts affect corporate innovation output. He and Tian (2013) show 
there is an overall negative correlation between analyst coverage and corporate patent output. 
This paper is different from He and Tian (2013) in the sense that this paper studies innovative 
firms and non-innovative firms separately. I show that a small fraction of firms generated most 
of the existing patents. Even though the overall negative correlation does exist, the correlation 
between analyst coverage and corporate innovation output turns positive in innovative firms. 
Two criteria have been used to identify innovative firms: the firm’s past patent output and past 
R&D stock. The brokerage houses M&A and brokerage house closure events are used as quasi-
natural experiments for diff-in-diff analysis. The corporate innovation output also decreases in 
response to exogenous analyst coverage reduction. This paper shows the potential explanation 
for this positive correlation could be that the innovation efficiency is higher in innovative firms 
than non-innovative firms.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the data resources and the 
summary statistics. Section 2 introduces the criteria to separate the innovative firms from non-
innovative firms and shows the baseline regression results. Section 3 explains the quasi-natural 
experiment settings and the diff-in-diff analysis results. Section 4 discusses the potential 
mechanism that can affect corporate innovative activities. Section 5 is the conclusion. 
2. Sample and variable definition  
2.1 Sample and Data 
This sample includes US listed firms during the period of 1993-2015. The firm financial items 
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come from Compustat. Analyst coverage information is collected from the Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. Institutional holding data is from the Thomason’s CDA 
Spectrum database (13F). The Thomson’s SDC Mergers and Acquisition database and the 
Factiva database are also used to identify M&A among brokerage houses and the brokerage 
house closure. 
The patent information of different firms is collected from the United States and Trademark 
Office (USPTO). USPTO grants patents and publishes the information on their website 
(https://bulkdata.uspto.gov/); the database covers patents granted from 1976. In spite of the 
information being publicly available, several issues impede academia using those data directly. 
First, the assignee names are not uniquely identified. Due to the difference in punctuation, 
spelling and corporate legal suffixes, one firm could use multiple names in the USPTO database. 
In addition, the original format of this data is XML, which is not user friendly. 
To standardize the patent data for research, prior literature provides methodologies. The most 
important one is the NBER patent data project led by Brownyn Hall, Adam Jaffe, and Manuel 
Trajtenberg (HJT). By standardizing entity names, they linked USPTO assignees to gvkey in the 
Compustat database. Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017)  (KPSS) extend the 
NBER patent database. Using digitized resources by Google, KPSS is able to extract the patent 
filing and citation information from 1929 to 2010. The patents included in my sample are patents 
that have been granted by USPTO before December 31, 2017. However, the innovation measure 
is based on the patent information of the filing year. On average, it takes two years for a patent to 
be approved by USPTO. Therefore, my sample ends in 2015 while the granted patent 
information ends in 2017. The procedure of my extension can be found in the Appendix. 
Two measures are used as proxy for corporate innovation. The first is the natural logarithm of 
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one plus the citation-weighted patent number. As Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) 
show, not only the number of granted patents is important for corporate innovation but also the 
citations received by each patent. The citation-weighted patent number takes both the patent 
number and its future citation into consideration. An alternative measure is the natural logarithm 
of one plus the number of citations per patent. He and Tian (2013) argue that the average number 
of citations per patent can measure the overall innovation quality of that firm. 
Firm size (LnAssets), tangibility (PPEAssets), profitability (ROA), market-to-book (MB), 
leverage, capital expenditures (CapexAssets), KZindex, and age are included as control 
variables. In addition, to control for the inverted-U relationship (Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, 
Griffith, and Howitt, 2005), Hindex and Hindex square are also control variables in this study. 
To control for the institutional investors effect on corporate innovation (Aghion, Van Reenen, 
and Zingales (2013)), IO, which is the fraction of public firms’ shares owned by institutional 
investors, is another control variable. The definition for the control variables can be found in the 
appendix and variables summary statistics listed in Table 1 
2.2 Summary Statistics 
All the variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Following He and Tian (2013), 
citation-weight patent numbers and the quality are set to zero if there is no available information 
found in the USPTO database. The R&D expenditure is also set to zero if the value is missing in 
the Compustat dataset. There are 11.17 average patents granted per year and citations per patent 
are 5.45. The distribution of patents is highly skewed. Nearly 70% of the observations have zero 
patents, indicating that only a small group of public firms are involved in patenting activities. 
This highly skewed distribution can also be found in R&DAsset. More than 50% of the firms 
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have zero or missing R&D expenditures in this sample. 
3 Research question and baseline regression: 
3.1 Research Question  
Two facts should be mentioned about a firm’s investment in R&D up front. First, more than 50% 
of R&D spending is the wages and salaries of scientists and engineers. Firms who engage in 
innovative projects tend to smooth their R&D spending over time to avoid having to lay off 
knowledgeable employees (Hall and Lerner (2010)). There is a high adjustment cost for R&D 
spending. The second fact is that more than 50% of the firms in the sample are not involved in 
R&D investment. This can be inferred from the summary statistics for R&DAssets, as well as 
Patent. The medians for both variables are zero in this sample. 
These two facts are the starting points of my research question. It can be inferred from the data 
that patents are highly concentrated in innovative firms.  More than 70% of the public firms 
generate less than one patent per year. There are two distinct groups of firms: the innovative 
firms and the firms with little innovation experience.  
He and Tian (2013) find that there is an overall significant negative correlation between 
corporate innovation and analyst coverage. Given the facts mentioned above, the main reason 
behind this negative correlation is ambiguous.  One possible explanation, which is the argument 
in He and Tian (2013), is that the pressure from analyst forecasts keeps firms from investing 
more in innovation. As a consequence, the future patent output decreases. On the other hand, 
however, given the fact that most public firms do not engage in patenting activities, this overall 
negative correlation could be driven by those non-innovative firms. The small group of 
innovative firms, who generated most of the patents granted every year, should be studied 
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separately. Whether analyst coverage has different effects on these two groups of firms is the 
research interest of this paper.  
To separate innovative firms from non-innovative firms, two criteria are applied. The first 
criteria ranks firms based on their past 5-year citation-weighted patent number. Firms with high 
past patent records are treated as more innovative than the others. The second criteria separates 
firms by their past 5-year R&D stock. While the patents are the output of invested R&D for 
firms, firms who invested heavily in R&D projects in the past should also be more innovative; 
Panel B in Table 1 summarizes the patent and citation per patent (patent quality) information in 
each group. Most of the observations in my sample are non-innovative firms (62% and 51%). In 
addition, the firms are grouped into low, medium, and high based on these two criteria. Although 
the fraction of firms located in the high-level innovative group is approximately 10%, more than 
80% of the patents are generated by the high-level innovative firms (89% and 85%).  
Two sets of regression models are used in this paper to check whether analyst coverage has 
different effects on non-innovative and innovative firms. In the first regression, 4 dummy 
variables are created to identify non-innovative, low-level, medium-level and high-level 
innovative groups. The analyst coverage interacts with these 4 dummy variables to create the 
main variables: Coverage_non, Coverage_L, Coverage_M and Coverage_H: 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑖,𝑡+2 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝑀𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑_𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡             (1) 
The first regression assumes the control variables have the same effects on corporate innovation 
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and see the differences in the interaction terms. In the second regression, I separate my sample 
into two groups, the less innovative and more innovative firms. Specifically, the less innovative 
group includes the non-innovative firms and the low-level innovative firms. The medium-level 
and high-level groups are treated as more innovative group. This regression allows all the 
variables to behave differently in separate groups. 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑖,𝑡+2 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡         (2) 
The control variables are the same in both regressions. Year fixed effect and firm fixed effect are 
included in both regressions. The regression results are shown in Table 2 and Table 3. 
 
3.2 Regression Results 
The firm separation criteria in Table 2 is a firm’s past 5-year citation-weighted patent number. 
Panel A shows the result of regression (1) and Panel B shows the results of regression (2). In 
Panel A, Column 1 and Column 3 show the overall significant correlation between analyst 
coverage and corporate innovation which was proven by prior literature (He and Tian (2013)). 
Column 2 and Column 4 show how the coefficients of the interaction terms vary in different 
groups. The coefficients are negative and significant in both the non-innovative and low-level 
innovative groups. The coefficients become insignificant in medium-level innovative group and 
change to positively significant in high-level innovative firms.  
Panel B of Table 2 shows the results of regression (2). Column 1 and Column 4 are the OLS 
regression of the entire sample. Column 2 and Column 3 show the coefficients in less innovative 
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and more innovative firms separately. The signs of coefficients in these two columns are 
opposite, yet not significant. Column 5 and Column 6 also show opposite signs of coverage 
coefficients. The difference between Panel A and Panel B is that the control variables 
coefficients could vary in Panel B. Among the control variables, the coefficient of a firm’s age is 
positively significant in the less innovative group but negatively significant in the more 
innovative group. This is another evidence of how these two groups of firms are different from 
each other. In less innovative group, a more mature firm could afford to innovate. However, in 
more innovative group, the younger firms tend to be better innovators. 
The logic of Table 3 is same as Table 2 except that the ranking criteria is the past 5-year R&D 
stock. The R&D investment is the input of innovation investment. Firms with a higher R&D in 
the past should be more innovative than others. The results in Table 3 are consistent with Table 
2. Panel A shows the results of the regression model (1). The coefficients are negative in non-
innovative and low innovative firms and become positive when the innovative level changes to 
the highest level. This change happens for both citation-weighted patent number and patent 
quality. Panel B presents the results of regression model (2). Columns 2 and 3 show the 
correlation between analyst coverage and citation-weighted patent in separate groups. Column 5 
and Column 6 present the correlation between analyst coverage and patent quality. For both the 
citation-weighted patent and patent quality, the coefficient is negatively significant in the low-
innovative group and becomes positively significant in the high-innovative group. The opposite 
signs indicate that analysts may have different effects on low-innovative and high-innovative 
firms. 
In sum, the baseline regression shows the correlations between analyst coverage and innovation 
output are not consistent in low-innovative and high-innovative firms. The overall negative 
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correlation could be driven by the low-innovative firms. However, the correlation between 
analyst coverage and innovation output is positive in high-innovative firms. 
4 Diff-in-Diff Analysis 
4.1 Quasi-natural experiments 
 
To build a causal relationship between analyst coverage and corporate innovation, two quasi-
natural experiments are adopted to deal with the endogeneity concern.  
Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) show that brokerage closures are a plausibly exogenous source of 
variation for analyst coverage. The decision of closing research operations is uncorrelated with 
the performance of firms they choose to follow. In their paper, they provide a list of 43 
brokerage firms in the United States closing their research departments between Q1, 2000, and 
Q1, 2008.  
Another exogenous source of analyst coverage change is proposed by Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2010). They show that there is an exogenous analyst coverage drop when two brokerage houses 
merge. There is a group of firms that were followed by both the acquirer and the target brokerage 
house. After these brokerage houses merged, some analysts were fired due to redundancy. 15 
brokerage merger events are listed from 1984 to 2005 in Hong and Kacperczyk (2010). 13 events 
during 1996-2006 are extracted for this study.   
Since the time range in my sample is from 1993 to 2015, I extend these two kinds of events 
following their methodology. First, I construct a list of broker firms by checking the brokers that 
disappeared in the I/B/E/S database. Then, I created another list of brokers involved in M&A in 
which 100% of the target is acquired by using Thomson’s SDC Mergers and Acquisition 
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database. After constructing these two lists of potential events, I check each event manually by 
searching news in the Factiva database to identify the qualified experiment events and the exact 
event time. 
4.1 Treatment and control firms  
In the event of brokerage closures, the treated firms are identified as the firms covered by the 
closed brokerage house 3 to 15 months before the event date. In addition, I checked the I/B/E/S 
stop file to make sure the stop date is not before the closure date. In the events of brokerage 
mergers, treated firms have to be covered by both the target and acquirer 3 to 15 months before 
the event date.  In addition, one of the analysts who follows the treated firm before the event date 
should disappear after the event date. 
Following prior literature by He and Tian (2013) and Derrien and Kecskes (2013), I treat the six 
months symmetrically around identified disappearance dates as the event period. The analyst 
coverage for one firm at year -1 is computed as the average number analyst forecast between 3 
and 15 months before the event date, while the analyst coverage at year +1 is average analyst 
coverage between 3 and 15 months after event date. For example, if the event date is March 2000 
and the treated firm’s fiscal year end month is December, the year -1 indicates the company 
characteristic information in December 1999, while year +1 is the information in December 
2001. 
For treatment firms, there should be no missing data for those matching variables, including firm 
size (natural logarithm of total assets), market to book, analyst coverage (number of analyst 
forecasts). Furthermore, to narrow down treated firms to those firms engaged in innovation 
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before the events, I require both treated firms and control firms having at least one patent in the 
matching year (year -1).  
Firms in the control group are picked from firms that are not covered by the involved brokerage 
houses in event year -1. Based on the spirit of Hong and Kacperczyk (2010), candidate control 
firms are required to be in the same size tercile, market-to-book tercile, analyst tercile, and 5-
year patent number or R&D stock rate tercile. For every treated firm, I picked 5 control firms 
with the smallest analyst coverage difference. My final sample includes 1,542 treated firms with 
their matched control firms. The number of treated firms decreases to 1,116 if I require both 
patent and R&D not to be zero in the matching year. 
4.2 Diff-in-Diff analysis for corporate innovation  
Figure 2 shows how the analyst coverage seven-year difference (treated-control) changes in the 
7-year event window. Compared with the control group, treated firms’ analyst coverage dropped 
approximately 0.9 from year -1 to year +1.  
Following He and Tian (2013), I normalize each treated firm’s difference in the number of 
citation-weighted patent or citations per patent (quality) by the average total number between 
this treatment and the matched control portfolio over the three-year pre-event period. After this 
normalization, any change of patent output should be interpreted as percentage change rather 
than absolute amount. In Table 4, treated firms and firms in control group are matched by firm 
size, market-to-book, analyst coverage, and past 5-year average citation-weighted patent number. 
In Table 5, the past 5-year citation-weighted average patent number was changed to past 5-year 
R&D stock level.  
Table 4 shows the quantitative analysis. Change of citation-weighted patent number is defined as 
the citation-weighted patent generated in years [+1, +3] minus patents generated in years [-3, -1] 
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scaled by average total number of innovation measures between this treatment and the matched 
control portfolio over the three-year pre-event period. Consistent with the evidence in He and 
Tian (2013), there is a significant increase in citation-weighted patent number after the 
exogenous reduction of analyst coverage. Despite the overall positive change of the whole 
sample, the changes among those three groups of firms are different. Both the citation-weighted 
patent number and the patent quality decrease along with the exogenous reduction of analyst 
coverage in high-level innovative firms. To be more specific, the average pre-event number of 
citation-weighted patents is 14 in the low-level innovative group; 0.248 means treated firms 
generate 3.47 more citation-weighted patents compared to control firms in the following 3 years 
after the event date. Meanwhile, firms in high-level innovative group generate over 1,300 patents 
per year before the events. Negative 0.093 indicates that the treated group generates 120 fewer 
patents compared to control firms 3 years after the event. As to patent quality, low-level 
innovative treated firms generated 1.72 more citations per patent compared to their control 
group. In the high-level innovative group, treated firms generate 1.2 fewer citations per patent 
compared to their control firms. 
Table 5 changes the matching criteria. Instead of past citation-weighted patent numbers, treated 
and control firms are matched by their past 5-year R&D stock level. The results are consistent 
with Table 4. The average changes in citation-weighted patent numbers and patent quality are 
positive and significant, while the high-level innovative group shows the opposite changes.  
 
4.3 Diff-in-Diff analysis for R&D investment  
This section studies the R&D expense changes around these events. If a higher analyst coverage 
leads to severe managerial myopia, R&D expenses should be affected more directly than future 
patent output. Table 6 shows the how R&DAssets change around exogenous reduction of analyst 
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coverage. In low-innovative group, the R&DAssets increase 0.004 more compared to their 
control group. This change is consistent with the managerial myopia concern; the analyst 
coverage reduction alleviates the CEO’s short-term pressure and motivates them to invest more 
in long-term R&D projects. However, the change of R&DAssets also shows an opposite 
direction in the high-level innovative group. This consequential R&DAssets change following 
the exogenous analyst coverage reduction cannot be explained by the managerial myopia 
hypothesis. One possible explanation could be that innovative firms’ willingness to innovate is 
affected by the worsened information environment.   
Using two quasi-natural experiments, this section shows how analysts affect innovative firms 
differently. After exogenous analyst coverage reduction, corporate innovation output increases. 
However, the citation-weighted patent number and the citations per patent decrease in response 
to exogenous analyst coverage reduction for high-innovative firms. In addition, highly 
innovative firms’ investment in R&D is not as high as their control group if there is an 
exogenous analyst coverage reduction. These results indicate that analyst coverage has a positive 
effect on corporate innovation.  
5 Different mechanisms 
5.1 Short-term pressure and managerial myopia 
The short-term pressure to meet analyst earnings forecasts forces managers to sacrifice long-term 
investment. The negative correlation between analyst coverage and corporate innovation could 
be a result of this managerial myopia. The results presented in this paper also support this 
managerial myopia hypothesis. Specifically, for firms with little past innovation experience in 
terms of both R&D expense and patent output, analyst coverage impedes corporate innovation. 
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Exogenous analyst coverage reduction increases firms’ R&D expense as well as their future 
patents. 
5.2 Analyst monitoring and information production 
The managerial myopia issue could explain how analysts impede corporate innovation, but it 
cannot explain the positive correlation between analyst coverage and corporate innovation for 
high-innovative firms. The monitoring role played by analysts provide a better interpretation of 
the results. For firms with little innovation experience, analysts impede corporate innovation 
because they treat the innovation projects by those non-innovative firms as value-destroying 
investment. On the other hand, however, analysts encourage innovative firms to invest more in 
innovation. In addition, the analyst coverage can reduce information asymmetry and thus 
decrease firms’ cost of capital (Derrien and Kecskes (2013)). Gustaf Bellstam et al. (2017) also 
show that analysts emphasize corporate innovation in their analyst reports. Lower cost of capital 
and a better information environment can motivate a firm to innovate. 
5.3 Innovation efficiency 
If monitoring is the potential mechanism, the innovation efficiency could also be different in 
innovative and non-innovative firms. Analysts prevent firms with little innovation experience 
from being involved in innovation because the innovation efficiency is low for these firms.  
Two measures are used for corporate innovation efficiency. The first is the measure introduced 
by Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013): 
𝐼𝐸1𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2 + 0.8𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3 + 0.6𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4 + 0.4𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5 + 0.2𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6
 
16 
 
 
This measure captures the cost to generate one patent (patent per dollar). The second measure 
uses the same logic with a different numerator: 
𝐼𝐸2𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡)
𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2 + 0.8𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3 + 0.6𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4 + 0.4𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5 + 0.2𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6
 
The market value of patents is proposed by Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017). 
Intuitively, it can be interpreted as the total three-day market value increment around the 
announcement day (patent grant date). Both the numerator and the denominator dollar value is 
1982 dollars. The following model is used to simply test whether the innovation efficiency is 
different. The results are shown in Table 7. 
𝐿𝑛𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑤(𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡               
Table 7 shows that for firms with high patent portfolio level, their innovation efficiency is 
significantly higher than in other firms. For firms with past low patenting activities, their ability 
to generate patents with good market value is significantly lower than the average. 
The results shown in this section try to explain the reason analysts favor firms with high patent 
pools to do innovation while impeding firms with low patent pools to innovate. 
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6 Conclusion 
This paper studies how the analysts affect corporate innovation. Two types of public firms exist 
simultaneously, low-innovative firms and innovative firms. Most granted patents are generated 
by a small number of innovative firms. This paper finds analysts have positive effects on 
corporate innovation for the innovative firms although the overall correlation between analyst 
coverage and innovation output is negative. The analyst coverage plays opposite roles in low-
innovative and high-innovative firms. The low-innovative firms drive the overall effect to be 
negative because of their overwhelming numbers in the sample. Two quasi-natural experiments 
are used to build causality relationships. The results show analysts impede low-innovative firms 
investing in innovation yet encourage high-innovative firms’ innovation. In addition, this paper 
shows that high-innovative firms’ innovation efficiency is higher compared to low-innovative 
firms. The difference of the innovation efficiency could be the mechanism that results in 
analysts’ different effects on corporate innovation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Appendix 
 
 
The figure above is a typical patent front page. On this page, several important items are 
disclosed, including the patent number, data of filing, grated date, inventors’ names, assignee, 
classification, and citations. 
Patents in the United States are granted by the United States and Trademark Office (USPTO). 
Initially, the patent information is published by USPTO on https://bulkdata.uspto.gov/. The 
database covers patents granted from 1976.  
Several issues make this database difficult for researchers to use. First, there is no unique 
identifier for assignees nor inventors. As a consequence, the same firm could have multiple 
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names in this database due to punctuation, spelling and corporate legal suffixes. Another issue is 
that the original data is in xml format, which is not a standard format for academia. 
Prior literature contributed a great deal to standardize the patent data for research. The NBER 
patent data project is the most used database in innovation literature. This project is led by 
Brownyn Hall, Adam Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg (HJT)1. Their name standardization 
methodology2 is also used by this paper to extend the patent database. 
Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoffman (2017)3 (KPSS) extend the NBER patent database. 
Using digitized resources by Google, KPSS extract the patent filing and citation information 
from 1929 to 2010. Another project by Harvard University 4 also extends the patent data set to 
2010. This project aims to identify individual inventors from the U.S. utility patent database by 
using the Bayesian supervised learning approach. 
Methodology used for data extension: 
The original data comes from USPTO (https://bulkdata.uspto.gov/). Patent Official Gazettes 
includes the information on the front page (as the figure showed above). The patent number, 
assignee name and citation could be extracted from this file. Then I follow the steps of KPSS 
(2017) to standardize the patent assignee name. 
Step 1: For those assignees that have been identified by KPSS (2010), I take their permno and 
assign the same permno to the future patent with the exact same assignee name. 
                                                     
1 This database is available on: https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads 
 
2 Jim Bessen shared the standardization codes on: 
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/posts/namestandardizationroutinesuploaded 
 
3 This database is available on: https://iu.app.box.com/v/patents 
 
4 This dataset is available on: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/patent 
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Step 2: I follow the name standardization procedure suggested by Brownyn Hall, Adam Jaffe, 
and Manuel Trajtenberg (HJT). The idea of their methodology is to remove the less informative 
words from company names such as “Co.”,” INTL”, and “Group”. Then I match the assignee 
names with company Compustat names based on the more meaningful words. 
Step 3: I sort the rest of the assignee names according to their total granted patents. I manually 
match assignee names with the most patents. This step adds 100 more assignee-gvkey pairs as 
well as 154,933 more patents to my data set from 1976 to 2018. 
Figure 1 shows the data comparison between KPSS (2010) and the patent data used in this paper.  
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Chapter 1: Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A 
Variables 25P Median Mean 75P Std N 
Patent 0.000 0.000 11.172 1.000 49.418 59000 
Quality 0.000 0.000 5.452 1.500 15.453 59000 
Analysts 2.357 4.769 7.102 9.583 6.644 59000 
R&DAssets 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.061 0.101 59000 
Lnasset 4.934 6.254 6.410 7.703 2.012 59000 
PPEAssets 0.077 0.191 0.272 0.413 0.241 59000 
Age 7.000 13.000 18.231 25.000 15.138 59000 
ROA 0.056 0.117 0.085 0.174 0.183 59000 
Leverage 0.019 0.173 0.210 0.335 0.203 59000 
CapexAssets 0.019 0.040 0.060 0.076 0.064 59000 
MB 1.142 1.570 2.153 2.454 1.665 59000 
Kzindex -7.797 -1.603 -9.030 0.564 21.566 59000 
Hindex 0.087 0.158 0.209 0.265 0.175 59000 
IO 0.253 0.504 0.496 0.734 0.285 59000 
 
Panel B 
Innovation Levels by Groups 
Groups 
Group by patent Group by R&D stock 
Patent number  Quality Patent number Quality 
Non-innovative 1.39 0.02 1.24 1.70 
Low 0.82 4.68 1.51 6.93 
Medium 4.30 14.71 4.66 8.81 
High 75.91 23.62 52.82 11.95 
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Chapter 1: Table 2 Regression 
 
Panel A: Firms are ranked by their past 5-year citation-weighted patent number 
 Citation-weighted Patent Number Citation per patent (Quality) 
Dependent 
Variables 
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡+2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coverage -0.039**  -0.030**  
 (0.020)  (0.013)  
Coverage_non  -0.128***  -0.051*** 
  (0.018)  (0.008) 
Coverage_L  -0.118***  -0.066*** 
  (0.024)  (0.010) 
Coverage_M  0.040  -0.007 
  (0.031)  (0.010) 
Coverage_H  0.421***  0.094*** 
  (0.038)  (0.011) 
Lnasset 0.224*** 0.196*** 0.088*** 0.080*** 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.018) (0.008) 
Leverage -0.405*** -0.359*** -0.225*** -0.212*** 
 (0.081) (0.074) (0.052) (0.029) 
Lnage 0.225*** 0.157*** 0.135*** 0.117*** 
 (0.055) (0.051) (0.036) (0.015) 
ROA -0.100 -0.075 -0.082 -0.075** 
 (0.088) (0.086) (0.063) (0.036) 
IO -0.008 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.071) (0.069) (0.050) (0.027) 
R&DAssets 0.485** 0.524** 0.343** 0.355*** 
 (0.231) (0.227) (0.159) (0.086) 
MB 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) 
CapexAssets -0.166 -0.095 -0.158 -0.140 
 (0.161) (0.157) (0.118) (0.089) 
KZindex -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
PPEAssets 0.945*** 0.874*** 0.567*** 0.548*** 
 (0.139) (0.132) (0.091) (0.052) 
HHI 0.365** 0.308* 0.182 0.166*** 
 (0.179) (0.168) (0.126) (0.059) 
HHI_square -0.032 -0.019 0.004 0.008 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.044) (0.024) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 59000 59000 59000 59000 
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Panel B: Firms are ranked by their past 5-year citation-weighted patent number 
 Citation-weighted Patent Patent quality 
Dependent 
Variables 
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡+2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Coverage -0.039** -0.005 0.043 -0.030** -0.005 0.038 
 (0.020) (0.010) (0.030) (0.013) (0.008) (0.027) 
Lnassets 0.224*** 0.049*** 0.351*** 0.088*** 0.030*** 0.008 
 (0.027) (0.013) (0.031) (0.018) (0.011) (0.033) 
Leverage -0.405*** -0.117*** -0.458*** -0.225*** -0.103*** -0.067 
 (0.081) (0.043) (0.107) (0.052) (0.035) (0.089) 
Lnage 0.225*** 0.062** -0.354*** 0.135*** 0.053** -0.284*** 
 (0.055) (0.025) (0.060) (0.036) (0.020) (0.072) 
ROA -0.100 -0.080 0.250** -0.082 -0.076* 0.138 
 (0.088) (0.053) (0.121) (0.063) (0.044) (0.121) 
IO -0.008 -0.024 -0.147 -0.002 -0.019 -0.155 
 (0.071) (0.041) (0.105) (0.050) (0.033) (0.102) 
R&DAssets 0.485** 0.252 0.871*** 0.343** 0.193 0.182 
 (0.231) (0.183) (0.269) (0.159) (0.151) (0.258) 
MB 0.057*** 0.015*** 0.059*** 0.036*** 0.013*** 0.019** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) 
CapexAssets -0.166 -0.124 -0.284 -0.158 -0.125* -0.077 
 (0.161) (0.089) (0.399) (0.118) (0.076) (0.383) 
KZindex -0.000 0.000 -0.002* -0.001 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PPEAssets 0.945*** 0.202*** 1.330*** 0.567*** 0.155** 0.305 
 (0.139) (0.078) (0.220) (0.091) (0.065) (0.223) 
HHI 0.365** -0.056 0.557 0.182 -0.059 -0.367 
 (0.179) (0.101) (0.472) (0.126) (0.082) (0.482) 
HHI_square -0.032 0.052 -0.019 0.004 0.047 0.629 
 (0.054) (0.052) (0.480) (0.044) (0.044) (0.500) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 59000 44157 14843 59000 44157 14843 
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Chapter 1: Table 3 Regression Results 
 
Panel A: Firms are ranked by their past 5-year R&D stock 
Dependent 
Variables 
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡+2 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Coverage -0.039**  -0.030**  
 (0.020)  (0.013)  
Coverage_non  -0.122***  -0.062*** 
  (0.020)  (0.014) 
Coverage_L  -0.051*  -0.023 
  (0.028)  (0.021) 
Coverage_M  0.028  0.006 
  (0.028)  (0.019) 
Coverage_H  0.127***  0.016 
  (0.032)  (0.019) 
Lnasset 0.224*** 0.204*** 0.088*** 0.084*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018) 
Leverage -0.405*** -0.406*** -0.225*** -0.224*** 
 (0.081) (0.080) (0.052) (0.052) 
Lnage 0.225*** 0.193*** 0.135*** 0.126*** 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.036) (0.036) 
ROA -0.100 -0.115 -0.082 -0.086 
 (0.088) (0.087) (0.063) (0.063) 
IO -0.008 -0.024 -0.002 -0.009 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.050) (0.050) 
R&DAssets 0.485** 0.348 0.343** 0.318** 
 (0.231) (0.231) (0.159) (0.159) 
MB 0.057*** 0.060*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
CapexAssets -0.166 -0.162 -0.158 -0.157 
 (0.161) (0.161) (0.118) (0.118) 
KZindex -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
PPEAssets 0.945*** 0.947*** 0.567*** 0.569*** 
 (0.139) (0.138) (0.091) (0.091) 
HHI 0.365** 0.380** 0.182 0.186 
 (0.179) (0.176) (0.126) (0.126) 
HHI_square -0.032 -0.037 0.004 0.003 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.044) (0.044) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 59000 59000 59000 59000 
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Panel B: Firms are ranked by their past 5-year R&D stock 
 Citation-weighted Patent Patent quality 
Dependent 
Variables 
𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡+2 𝐿𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑡+2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (3) 
Coverage -0.039** -0.040** 0.053** -0.030** -0.025* 0.044* 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.025) (0.013) (0.013) (0.026) 
Lnassets 0.224*** 0.163*** 0.263*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.022 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.018) (0.017) (0.033) 
Leverage -0.405*** -0.266*** -0.256*** -0.225*** -0.161*** -0.065 
 (0.081) (0.078) (0.084) (0.052) (0.053) (0.085) 
Lnage 0.225*** 0.335*** 0.269*** 0.135*** 0.229*** 0.173** 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.036) (0.036) (0.079) 
ROA -0.100 -0.230** 0.080 -0.082 -0.212*** 0.082 
 (0.088) (0.112) (0.081) (0.063) (0.082) (0.083) 
IO -0.008 0.012 -0.110 -0.002 0.022 -0.036 
 (0.071) (0.068) (0.086) (0.050) (0.047) (0.100) 
R&DAssets 0.485** 1.061 0.579*** 0.343** 0.428 0.202 
 (0.231) (1.368) (0.174) (0.159) (1.138) (0.179) 
MB 0.057*** 0.029*** 0.043*** 0.036*** 0.024*** 0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
CapexAssets -0.166 -0.287** 0.284 -0.158 -0.187* 0.077 
 (0.161) (0.141) (0.349) (0.118) (0.112) (0.336) 
KZindex -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PPEAssets 0.945*** 0.750*** 0.773*** 0.567*** 0.500*** 0.258 
 (0.139) (0.129) (0.205) (0.091) (0.090) (0.241) 
HHI 0.365** 0.020 1.151*** 0.182 -0.009 -0.405 
 (0.179) (0.169) (0.444) (0.126) (0.119) (0.610) 
HHI_square -0.032 0.035 -0.440 0.004 0.036 0.893 
 (0.054) (0.053) (0.522) (0.044) (0.045) (0.622) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 59000 41147 17853 59000 41147 17853 
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Chapter 1: Table 4 Diff-in-Diff Analysis 
Panel A: Citation-weighted patent 
  Treated Firms Control Firms DiD 
  Before After Change Before After Change Difference 
Overall 0.862 0.886 0.024 1.138 1.055 -0.083 0.107*** 
Low 0.741 1.189 0.448 1.259 1.459 0.200 0.248*** 
Medium 0.751 0.661 -0.090 1.249 0.992 -0.257 0.167** 
High 1.093 0.807 -0.287 0.907 0.713 -0.194 -0.093*** 
Panel B: Patent Quality 
  Treated Firms Control Firms DiD 
  Before After Change Before After Change Difference 
Overall 0.867 0.589 -0.279 1.133 0.672 -0.461 0.182*** 
Low 0.732 0.683 -0.048 1.268 0.800 -0.468 0.421*** 
Medium 0.875 0.512 -0.363 1.124 0.606 -0.519 0.156*** 
High 0.993 0.568 -0.425 1.007 0.612 -0.394 -0.03*** 
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Chapter 1: Table 5 Diff-in-Diff Analysis 
Panel A: Citation-weighted patent 
  Treated Firms Control Firms DiD 
  Before After Change Before After Change Difference 
Overall 0.745 0.584 -0.164 1.255 0.954 -0.299 0.135*** 
Low 0.443 0.417 -0.028 1.557 1.060 -0.495 0.467*** 
Medium 0.807 0.609 -0.202 1.193 0.995 -0.198 -0.004 
High 0.982 0.723 -0.261 1.018 0.809 -0.209 -0.052*** 
Panel B: Patent Quality 
  Treated Firms Control Firms DiD 
  Before After Change Before After Change Difference 
Overall 0.927 0.576 -0.351 1.072 0.650 -0.422 0.071*** 
Low 0.802 0.483 -0.048 1.197 0.634 -0.468 0.247*** 
Medium 0.902 0.571 -0.363 1.097 0.695 -0.519 0.07*** 
High 1.076 0.671 -0.425 0.923 0.621 -0.394 -0.105*** 
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Chapter 1: Table 6 Diff-in-Diff in R&D investment 
 
 
 
 
Firms are ranked by past 5-year citation patent number 
 
Treated Firms Control Firms DiD 
Before After Change Before After Change Difference 
Overall 0.084 0.089 0.005 0.091 0.095 0.004 0.001 
Low 0.086 0.094 0.008 0.101 0.104 0.003 0.004** 
Medium 0.091 0.098 0.007 0.099 0.103 0.004 0.002 
High 0.076 0.077 0.001 0.073 0.077 0.004 -0.003*** 
 
  
29 
 
Chapter 1: Table 7 Regression Results in innovation efficiency 
The first is the measure introduced by Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013), where patent number is the number 
of patent granted in year t 
 
𝐼𝐸1𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡/(𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2 + 0.8𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3 + 0.6𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4 + 0.4𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5 + 0.2𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6) 
 
The market value of patent is proposed by Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017). Intuitively, 
it can be interpreted as the total three-day market value increment around announcement day (patent grant 
date). Both numerator and denominator dollar values are 1982 dollars. 
 
𝐼𝐸2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒(𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡)/(𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2 + 0.8𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3 + 0.6𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−4 + 0.4𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−5 +  0.2𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−6) 
 
The following model is used  
 
𝐿𝑛𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑤(𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ(𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦) + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 lnIE1 lnIE2 
 Patent number Patent value 
Low 0.005 -0.041** 
 (0.013) (0.017) 
High 0.179*** 0.298*** 
 (0.015) (0.028) 
Tobin’s Q 0.008*** 0.100*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Leverage 0.085*** 0.070 
 (0.028) (0.047) 
CapexAssets 0.464*** 0.740*** 
 (0.129) (0.198) 
Lnasset -0.101*** 0.087*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
ROA 0.146*** 0.124*** 
 (0.022) (0.033) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
N 15080 15080 
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Chapter 1: Figure 1 Updated Patent Data 
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Chapter 1: Figure 2 Analyst Coverage Change 
This figure shows the time-series difference of analyst coverage between treated firm and control firms. 
Year -1 is defined as the number of analyst forecasts between -15 months and -4 months before the event 
date. Year -2 is defined as forecasts number in prior 12 months (-27 month to -16 month). Year +1 is 
defined as the number of analyst forecasts between +4 months and +15 months before the event date. On 
average, the exogenous reduction of analyst coverage from year -1 to year +1 is 0.9   
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Chapter 1: Figure 3 Innovation Efficiency 
 
 
• Patent Q =
∑ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖
𝑁
1
𝑋𝑅𝐷 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
.   
• This measure can be interpreted as patent-level Tobin’s q. The numerator is the total patent value 
reflected by firm’s market value change and the denominator is the R&D expense in filing year. 
• Firms are sorted into 10 groups based on their patent pool 
• Since patent value is highly correlated to a firm's market capitalization. The firms' capitalization 
is controlled in this figure 
• Both patent value and XRD (R&D spending) are in 1982 dollars 
• This figure shows the median number for this ratio in these 10 group of firms  
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CHAPTER 2: Analyst coverage and Corporate Disclosure Informativeness 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines how analysts affect corporate disclosure in their textual content. Both 
public firms and sell-side analysts provide information to financial market participants. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires public firms annually disclose their 
financial performance in Form 10-K. Analysts show their opinions about the firms they cover by 
providing earnings forecasts and analyst reports. This paper studies how corporate disclosure 
textual content changes in response to analyst coverage variation. 
Specific items are required to be disclosed in 10-K (See the Appendix). Besides 10-K Form, this 
paper also studies Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A item 7) and Risk Factors (item 
1a) separately.  Managers discuss their perspectives of corporate operation in MD&A section. 
Such disclosure would be helpful to investors to form their opinions about this firm’s future 
performance. The Risk Factors section discusses ‘‘the most significant factors that make the 
company speculative or risky’’ (Regulation S–K, Item 305(c), SEC 2005). The Risk Factors 
section was added to 10-K from 2005. Cohen, Malloy and Nguyen (2018) shows the risk factors 
section is especially informative for future returns. Therefore, this paper extracts these two parts 
separately and shows how they are affected by analyst coverage. 
The measurement used in this paper includes Score (Brown and Tucker (2011), length of textual 
content (Length), and Fog (Li (2008)). Score measures the year-by-year modification in the 
textual content. Brown and Tucker (2011) argue the document is not informative enough if it 
does not change appreciably from the previous years. Length just measures the number of words 
used in each textual content part. Fog is originally from linguistics, which measures the 
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readability of a textual document. 
To deal with the potential endogeneity concern in the analysis of the relationship between 
corporate disclosure and analyst coverage, this paper uses two plausible quasi-natural 
experiments, brokerage house closure (Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012)) and broker merger and 
acquisition (Hong and Kacperczyk (2010)).  These two events provide exogeneous analyst 
coverage reduction shock and resolve endogeneity concerns. 
In the baseline regression, there is a negatively significant correlation between analyst coverage 
and the document modification Score. This negatively significant correlation exists in 10-K, 
MD&A section and Risk Factors section. The correlations between analyst coverage and the 
other two measures (Length and Fog) are not consistent in different settings. In the quasi-natural 
experiment analysis, modification scores increase in 10-K, MD&A, and risk factor section in 
response to the exogeneous reduction of analyst coverage. Length and Fog show different results 
in 10-K, MD&A, and risk factor sections. The Length of 10-K increases after analyst coverage 
reduction while the change of readability is insignificant. The Length increase in the MD&A 
section while the readability decreases significantly. Neither the change of length nor the change 
of Fog is significant in the risk factor section.  In sum, the modification score increases after 
analyst reduction, textual content length increases (or changes insignificantly) and readability 
(Fog) decreases (or changes insignificantly). Overall, these results suggest corporate disclosure 
informativeness increases after analyst coverage reduction. These results support Hypothesis 2. 
As there is adequate research which studies the relationship between analyst and the numeric part 
of the annual report, e.g. Irani and Oesch (2013), this paper unveils the correlation between the 
informativeness of the annual report textual content and analyst coverage.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses hypotheses of research 
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question. Section 3 describes the databases and measurement construction. Section 4 shows 
baseline results. Section 5 shows the diff-in-diff analysis and results.  
2. Hypothesis and related literature: 
 2.1 Textual analysis 
Corporate annual reports include both numeric and textual content. In recent years, increasing 
literature begin to pay attention to textual analysis which was overlooked by traditional finance 
and accounting research. Li (2008) adopted Fog index from computational linguistics literature 
to measure the readability of corporate annual reports and find that the firms with lower earnings 
are more likely to make their annual report hard to read. Li (2010) shows that the tone in the 
MD&A section can predict future a firm’s future performance. Loughran and McDonald (2014), 
however, argue that the 10-K document file size is a better proxy for readability compared to Fog 
index suggested by Li (2008). Brown and Tucker (2011) introduce cosine similarity for the 
informativeness in the MD&A section. Using a similar measurement, Cohen et al. (2018) find 
that the drop of the similarity score in 10-K, especially in the risk factors section, can predict 
future negative stock return. Hoberg, Gerard, and Phillips (2016) define industries based on 
firms’ product description in 10-K (Item 1). My paper studies the analyst effect on the textual 
content of firms’ annual reports based on the measures suggested by prior literature. 
 
 
2.2 Analyst effect on corporate activities 
Analyst influence on corporate behavior is also a topic that has been studied by a quantity of 
prior literature. Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) and Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) suggest two 
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quasi-natural experiments that can be used to study how analyst coverage affects corporate 
activities. Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) show the analyst coverage for the firms covered by both 
brokers before M&A will drop exogenously due to redundancy after the merger and acquisition 
of two brokerage houses. Similarly, Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) show this exogenous coverage 
reduction also happens once a brokerage house is closed on account of its business strategy. 
These two quasi-natural experiments have been used in later literature.  
This paper discusses how analysts affect corporate textual disclosure behavior. There are two 
hypotheses in regarding of the different roles played by analysts.  
Hypothesis 1:  Analysts play the monitoring role for public firms. Higher analyst coverage 
increases disclosure informativeness. 
Like institutional investors, higher analyst coverage could impede public firms from involving 
misconduct. Chen, Tao, and Lin (2011) show analyst coverage could mitigate managerial 
expropriation of outside shareholders by constraining excess CEO compensation and prevent its 
value-destroying acquisition. Irani and Oesch (2013) show the analyst coverage could affect 
financial report quality. They use accruals-based measure as proxy for financial quality and find 
exogenous reduction of analyst coverage increases firm-level abnormal accruals. While this 
paper discusses the issue close to my research, the difference is that they concentrate on the 
numeric part (the accrual-based measure) of annual reports and my research concentrates on 
textual content. 
Hypothesis 2:  Analysts provide a better information environment for public firms. Public 
firms voluntarily disclose more information if they do not have high analyst coverage. 
Analysts also mitigate information asymmetry, and public firms benefit from a better 
information environment. Derrien and Kecskes (2013) show exogenous reduction of analyst 
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coverage increases the cost of capital of public firms and thus decreases their investment and 
financing. Balakrishnan et al. (2014) show public firm responses to exogenous analyst coverage 
reduction by voluntarily disclosing more information than regulations mandate. Voluntary 
disclosure is proxied by management earnings guidance. Liquidity improves as a result and in 
turn increases firm value. 
As to my research question, these two hypotheses predict opposite consequences if there is 
exogenous reduction of analyst coverage. If the first hypothesis is right, the textual content 
informativeness will also deteriorate after analyst coverage deduction due to less monitoring. 
However, if Hypothesis 2 is right, firms will increase the informativeness in their annual report 
in response to a worsened information environment. In my paper, the results support Hypothesis 
2 and find increased informativeness after exogeneous reduction of analyst coverage. 
3. Data and Textual Analysis Measurement 
3.1 Database: 
The sample period studied in this paper is fiscal years: 1995-2015. The annual report documents 
(10-K/10-K405) are downloaded from Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval 
(EDGAR). Following Loughran and McDonald (2011), HTML tags, XBRL tags, exhibits, 
ASCII-encoded PDFs, graphics, and XLS are removed from the documents.5 To focus on textual 
analysis, all tables (more than 10% of the content are numeric charts) are also removed. The 
items included in the 10-K files are listed in the Appendix. Among those items, I extracted 
“Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations” 
                                                     
5 Loughran and McDonald share their python code and detailed steps on their website: 
https://sraf.nd.edu/textual-analysis/ 
 
40 
 
(MD&A item7+ item 7A) and “Risk Factors” (item 1A) for separate analysis. 
The firms’ financial statement data comes from Compustat. The information of analyst and 
brokerage houses is downloaded from Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). 
Institutional ownership data comes from 13F. To identify brokerage house closure events, I also 
used Thomson’s SDC Mergers and Acquisition database and Factiva to extend the events list as 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) and Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012). The broker closures events have 
been updated to 2012; the number of events in each year can be found in the Appendix.  
3.2 Measurement used in textual analysis: 
Three dimensions of measurement have been used in this paper. The main variable is called 
score which was first introduced by Brown and Tucker (2011). Cosine similarity should be 
computed first before score. The cosine similarity is defined as below: 
Suppose there are two documents D1 and D2. Ds1 and Ds2  are the sets of words occurring in D1 
and D2, respectively. The union of  Ds1 and Ds2  is T. t𝑖 is the t
th word element of T. First, 
create the words frequency vector 𝐷1
𝑇𝐹 and 𝐷2
𝑇𝐹: 
             𝐷1
𝑇𝐹 = [𝑛𝐷1(𝑡1), 𝑛𝐷2(𝑡2), … , 𝐷1(𝑡𝑁)];            𝐷2
𝑇𝐹 = [𝑛𝐷2(𝑡1), 𝑛𝐷2(𝑡2), … , 𝐷2(𝑡𝑁)] 
Where 𝑛𝐷𝑘(𝑡𝑖) is the number of occurrence of term 𝑡𝑖 in 𝐷𝑘. The cosine similarity between two 
documents is then defined as: 
𝑆𝑖𝑚 = cos (𝜃) =
𝐷1
𝑇𝐹 . 𝐷2
𝑇𝐹
||𝐷1
𝑇𝐹||. ||𝐷2
𝑇𝐹||
 
Where 𝜃 is the angle between 𝐷1
𝑇𝐹 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷2
𝑇𝐹, (.) is the dot product operator, ||𝐷1
𝑇𝐹|| is the vector 
length of 𝐷1
𝑇𝐹, and ||𝐷2
𝑇𝐹|| is the vector length of 𝐷2
𝑇𝐹. This score is bounded between 0 and 1 
with a higher score indicating more similarity (cos(𝜃) = 1).  
To illustrate the intuition behind this similarity measure, take the following three statements as 
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example: 
D1: Revenue increase due to Microsoft Office system 
D2: Revenue increase due to Windows operating system 
D3: Revenue increase $3.2 billion due to Microsoft Office system 
To measure the similarity between D1 and D2, first we need to build the union of D1 and D2 
which includes all the words: 
T = [revenue, increase, due, to, Microsoft, office, system, windows, operating] 
Then, we count the frequency of each word in D1 and D2: 
𝐷1
𝑇𝐹 = [1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0] 
𝐷2
𝑇𝐹 = [1,1,1,1,0,0,1,1,1] 
The cosine similarity is the dot product of the two vectors over the product of their vector 
lengths: 
𝑆𝑖𝑚 = cos (𝜃) =
𝐷1
𝑇𝐹 . 𝐷2
𝑇𝐹
||𝐷1
𝑇𝐹||. ||𝐷2
𝑇𝐹||
 
𝑆𝑖𝑚 =
1 × 1 + 1 × 1 + 1 × 1 + 1 × 1 + 1 × 0 + 0 × 1 + 1 × 1 + 0 × 1 + 0 × 1
(√1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 0) × (√1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 1)
 
𝑆𝑖𝑚 = 0.714 
The cosine similarity between D1 and D2 is 0.714. 
Using the same procedure, we can compute the similarity between D1 and D3. The union of these two 
sentences is: 
T = [ revenue, increase, due, to, Microsoft, office, system, 3.2, billion] 
The word frequency vectors are: 
𝐷1
𝑇𝐹 = [1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0] 
𝐷3
𝑇𝐹 = [1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1] 
The cosine similarity is: 
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𝑆𝑖𝑚 =
1 × 1 + 1 × 1 + 1 × 1 + 1 × 1 + 1 × 1 + 1 × 1 + 1 × 1 + 0 × 1 + 0 × 1
(√1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 0) × (√1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1)
 
𝑆𝑖𝑚 = 0.882 
The similarity between D1 and D3 is 0.882. This quantitative measure did capture our intuition 
that the D1-D3 pair is more similar than the D1-D2 pair.  
Take the textual content in a real corporate annual report as another example. Here is the first 
paragraph of the MD&A section in the Disney 2014 annual report: 
“2014 vs. 2013: Revenues for fiscal 2014 increased 8%, or $3.8 billion, to $48.8 billion; net income 
attributable to Disney increased 22%, or $1.4 billion, to $7.5 billion; and diluted earnings per share 
attributable to Disney (EPS) for the year increased 26% or $0.88 to $4.26. The EPS increase in fiscal 
2014 reflected improved operating performance, a decrease in the weighted average shares outstanding 
as a result of our share repurchase program and higher investment gains.” 
We can compare this paragraph with the same part in Disney 2015 annual report: 
“2015 vs. 2014: Revenues for fiscal 2015 increased 7%, or $3.7 billion, to $52.5 billion; net income 
attributable to Disney increased 12%, or $881 million, to $8.4 billion; and diluted earnings per share 
attributable to Disney (EPS) for the year increased 15%, or $0.64 to $4.90. The EPS increase in fiscal 
2015 reflected improved operating performance and a decrease in the weighted average shares 
outstanding as a result of our share repurchase program, partially offset by the write-off of a deferred tax 
asset (discussed below) and lower investment gains.” 
When a firm discloses the same topic year by year, it tends to use the same textual words with 
updated numbers. The similarity measure gets 0.712 for the two paragraphs above. Overall, the 
change of the firms’ year-by-year similarity comes from two recourses. First, while the textual 
part of those topics tends to stay unchanged year by year, the updated numbers for those 
conventional topics reduce similarity. The increasing number of disclosed topics is another 
possibility that can reduce annual report similarity. If public firms disclose new topics, more 
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paragraphs have to be added to annual reports. Since these paragraphs did not appear in prior 
annual reports, document similarity will drop accordingly. 
Rawscore equals to 1 minus the similarity score, which measures how different the current year 
annual report is with last year’s annual report in the textual content. Updated numbers and the 
new topics are two main recourses of those differences. Therefore, Rawscore measures 
disclosure informativeness in terms of the fraction of numbers in textual content and the fraction 
of new topics (paragraphs) in annual reports.  
Brown and Tucker (2011) argue that Rawscore is positively correlated with document length by 
nature. Figure 3 shows the history average of disclosure similarity and document length from 
1995 to 2015.  I adjust Rawscore by the document length as Brown and Tucker (2011) did. 
Specifically, I regress Rawscore on the five polynomials of document length and obtain the 
predicted value empirically. The Score, which is the main variable used in this paper is computed 
as: 
Rawscore= 1- Sim (cosine similarity) 
Score=Rawscore - fitted score 
Score is treated as informativeness in prior literature (Brown and Tucker (2011), Cohen, Malloy 
and Nguyen (2018)). 
The second dimension for textual analysis is the length of document of interest. Length is 
defined as the natural logarithm of the number of words used in that document: 
Length = log (N_words) 
The number of words used in one document is a simple and intuitive measure for how much 
information that document discloses. The informativeness measurement, Score, is highly 
correlated with document length. A longer or a shorter document could result in lower similarity 
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score. The informativeness is designed to capture the increased disclosure rather than the 
decreased disclosure. To make sure the increment of the informativeness score is not driven by 
decreased disclosure, the correlation between the length of annual report documents and analyst 
coverage is also studied in this paper. 
The third measurement is the readability of the document. Robert Gunning developed the Fog 
index to measure readability of a document. Li (2008) adopted this index to measure the 
readability in corporate annual reports. The Fog index is calculated as follows: 
Fog=(words_per_sentence + percent_of_complex_words )* 0.4 
The complex words are defined as words with at least three syllables. A higher Fog index of one 
document indicates a higher difficulty to understand this document. Fog ≥ 18 means the text is 
unreadable. Loughran and McDonald (2014) suggest a 10-K document file size is a better proxy 
for readability than the Fog index. While the document file size is available for the 10-K 
document file, the size of the extracted MD&A and risk factor section is not available in my 
study. I use file size as robustness check for 10-K studies; the results are qualitatively similar to 
the fog index change. 
Document modification and increased document length could capture whether public firms 
disclose more textual content in their annual report. However, a more obscured document with a 
great number of ambiguous words could deteriorate the informativeness that I try to capture. 
Therefore, the readability of document is another dimension I included in this paper. Overall, an 
annual report with a higher modification score, longer document length, and lower readability 
score is treated as more informative in this paper. 
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3.3 Summary Statistics:  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in this paper. The definition of each 
variable can be found in Appendix.  In total, there are 53,861 firm-year observations in my 
sample from fiscal year period 1995-2005. Among those 53,861 firm-year observations, I am 
able to extract 41,350 (77%) MD&A sections (Item7 + Item 7A), which is comparable to 73% in 
Brown and Tucker (2011). For the risk factors, SEC mandated firms describe Item 1A after 
December 1, 2005, therefore, this part begins 2006. I have extracted 21,321 firm-year 
observations for risk factor analysis. 
Table 1a is the summary statistics for the textual analysis measurement. As shown in the table, 
more than 80% of the textual content does not change year-by-year. The similarity level in risk 
factors is even as high as 90% on average. Figure 1 shows the similarity distribution, indicating 
that the modification is not frequent in the textual content.  
Figure 2 shows the time-series changes for modification scores, length and Fog index. Consistent 
with Brown and Tucker (2011), the length of documents increases year-by-year and the 
modification score decreases accordingly. The trend of readability is also consistent with Li 
(2008).  
 
4. Baseline regression and the results： 
The baseline regression is designed as follows with different fixed effect specification: 
Disclosureit = α + β1Coverageit + 𝛿
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where Disclosureit includes three different measures (Scoreit, Lengthit 𝑎𝑛𝑑 Fogit ). The 
control variables used in 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes the firm-level financial information such as firm size, 
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institutional ownership, leverage, and firm age et al. The baseline regression results in different 
fixed effects specifications for 10-K. The MD&A sections and the Risk Factors sections are 
shown in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5, respectively.  
Table 3 summarizes the analyst coverage effects on whole 10-K documents. As to the Score part 
(panel A in Table 3), the analyst coverage is negatively correlated with Score in every 
specification. The significant level is 1% in every regression. The negative coefficients indicate 
that the increase (reduction) of analyst coverage would lead to less (more) disclosure 
modification in 10-K files. If the score can be interpreted as disclosure informativeness as prior 
literature suggested (Brown and Tucker (2011) and Cohen, Malloy and Nguyen (2018)), these 
results support the hypothesis that analyst coverage and information disclosed by firms are 
complementary. A worsened information environment (less analyst coverage) encourages firms 
to disclose more in their annual reports. For the regressions studying the MD&A section (Table 
4) and Risk Factors section (Table 5), the coefficients of analyst coverage are also negative and 
significant in every specification. The MD&A section and Risk Factors section are two important 
sections in the 10-K report. The robust coefficients showed in these two tables indicate that the 
modification in 10-K report also happens in the essential sections. 
The other two measures, document length and readability, however, do not show consistent 
results in regressions with different specifications.  
In panel B of table 3, the coefficient of analyst coverage turns from positively significant to 
negative as long as the firm fixed effect or the industry fixed effect is added. A significantly 
negatively coefficient indicates a reduction (increment) of analyst coverage correlated to a longer 
(shorter) document length. In panel B of Table 4 (MD&A section), the coefficients are not 
significant in every regression while the sign of this coefficient is not consistent either. In panel 
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B of Table 5, the coefficient turns from positively significant to negative, yet not significant once 
firm fixed effect was added. 
Panel C in the Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 studies the readability of each part. A positive 
(negative) coefficient implies that increment of analyst coverage would result in more (less) 
complex textual content. In Table 3 and Table 4, the coefficient stays positive without the firm 
fixed effect while becoming negative with firm fixed effect. In Table 5, the coefficients are all 
positive while the significance changes in different specifications. 
In sum, the conclusion that can be inferred from the baseline regression is the consistent negative 
correlation between analyst coverage and the document modification. Since the study only 
concentrates on the textual content of 10-K documents, this result shows that firms are more 
likely to do modification in the textual content when their information environment deteriorates.  
 
5. Identification and Diff-in-Diff analysis 
5.1 Quasi-natural experiments 
To address the endogeneity concern and understand the negative correlation between analyst 
coverage and firm textual disclosure, I adopt two quasi-natural experiments introduced by prior 
literature.  
Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) shows that if there two brokerage houses merged, there is an 
exogenous analyst coverage reduction for the firms covered by both brokerage houses due to 
redundancy. This analyst coverage reduction is not affected by the covered firms’ activities. In a 
similar setting, Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) find that brokerage closures are mainly triggered by 
their business consideration rather than the firms’ performance. The resulting reduction of 
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analyst coverage is another quasi-natural experiment used in my study. In this paper, I adopt 
these two events and extend their events period to more recent date. 
Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) provide a list of 43 brokerage closure events between Q1, 2000, and 
Q1, 2008; Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) published 15 brokerage house merge and acquisition 
events during the period 1984-2005. Since my sample period is from 1995 to 2015. I extend their 
events period following their methodology. First, I construct a list of broker firms by checking 
the brokers that disappeared in the I/B/E/S database. Then I create another list of brokers 
involved in M&A, in which 100% of the target is acquired by using Thomson’s SDC Mergers 
and Acquisition database. After constructing these two lists of potential events, I check each 
event manual by searching the news in the Factiva database to identify the qualified experiment 
events and the exact event dates. Overall, I study 52 events between 2000 and 2012. In the 
Appendix, I list the number of events in each year. This final list is comparable to the events 
used by Chen, Harford and Lin (2015). 
5.2 Construct treated and control group 
I follow Tian and He (2013) and Derrien and Keskes (2013) to construct the treatment group and 
the control group for the diff-in-diff analysis.  
In the brokerage house closures, the firms in treated group are identified as the firms covered by 
the closed brokers 3 to 15 months before the identified event date. In the cases of brokers 
mergers and acquisitions, the treated group are the firms covered by both the acquired broker and 
the target broker 3 to 15 months before the event date if the analysts who covered those treated 
firms disappeared in I/B/E/S after the M&A event date. Following Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012), 
I also checked I/B/E/S stop file in case the stop date is earlier than the event date. 
The six months around identified event dates are treated as the event period. Therefore, the 
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analyst coverage data for treated firms in year -1 measures the average number analyst forecasts 
3 to 15 months before the event date. Meanwhile, the analyst coverage for year +1 is the average 
number of analyst forecasts 3 to 15 months after the event date. For other firm characteristic 
data, the event time window is one year. For example, if the event date is March 2000 and the 
treated firm’s fiscal year end month is December, the year -1 indicates the firm characteristics 
information in December 1999 while the year +1 is the information in December 2001.  
For every treated firm, I pick up 5 control firms for this diff-in-diff analysis. Based on the spirit 
of Hong and Kacperczyk (2010), candidate control firms are required to be in the same size 
tercile, market-to-book tercile, analyst tercile, and the textual analysis measurement 
(Score/Length/Fog) tercile.  For the diff-in-diff analysis, I am able to identify 2,862 treated firms 
in the 10-K sample, 1,891 treated firms in the MD&A sample, and 729 treated firms in Risk 
Factors section sample. 
5.3 Results in Diff-in-Diff analysis 
Figure 2 shows how the analyst coverage four-year difference (treated-control) changes around 
those events. On average, the treated firms’ analyst coverage dropped by 1.2-1.6 from year -1 to 
year +1. The results of Diff-in-Diff analysis in the 10-K sample, MD&A sample and Risk 
Factors Sample are shown in Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 respectively. 
Table 6 shows the how the textual measurements change in 10-K due to the exogenous reduction 
of analyst coverage. The Score (document modification) and Length (number of words) of 
treated firms increased significantly compared to the control group. The Fog (readability) also 
increases, yet not significantly, in the 10-K sample. In addition, the Score increases more for the 
firms with less than 10 analyst forecasts before the event, while there is no significant change for 
firms covered by more than 10 analysts before the event. Overall, this table shows that when the 
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information environment becomes worse, firms tend to disclose more in their 10-K annual report 
while the readability stays unchanged. 
Table 7 only focuses on the Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section in the 10-
K report. This table shows that all three measurements change significantly after the analyst 
reduction. Specifically, Score (MD&A modification) increases, Length (words used in MD&A) 
increases and Fog (readability) decreases. All the changes are mainly driven by firms covered by 
less than 10 analysts before the events. Combining these three pieces of information, in response 
to a worsening information environment, firms disclose more information in MD&A section 
while decreasing the readability. These results are consistent with Balakrishnan et al. (2014), in 
which they find firms respond to an exogenous loss of analyst coverage by providing more 
timely and informative earning guidance. 
Table 8 shows the situation in the Risk Factors section. Score (modification) still increases after 
the analyst coverage reduction, while the Length and Fog (readability) changes are insignificant. 
Firms with less analyst coverage (coverage less than 10) react more in modification activities. 
For Fog (readability), these two subsamples show opposite effects. Readability in firms with less 
analyst coverage decreases, yet it increases in firms with more analyst coverage. 
First, the document modification (Score) happens in every sample. Second, this modification is 
not due to less disclosure (length increase). Third, the readability does not increase significantly 
after the analyst coverage, yet it decreases in the MD&A section. With all the evidence shown in 
these Diff-in-Diff analysis, analyst coverage and firm textual disclosure are more likely to be 
complementary to each other.  
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I examine the influence of analyst coverage on the textual content informativeness 
of corporate annual reports. Two quasi-natural experiments are used to test two competing 
hypotheses. I find there is a negative correlation between analyst coverage and document 
modification. When there is exogeneous reduction of analyst coverage, a firm’s year-by-year 
document modification increases. In addition, the length of textual content increases in 10-K as 
well as in MD&A section. In MD&A section, the readability also decreases in response to 
analyst reduction. 
The results in this paper support the hypothesis that corporate disclosure and analyst coverage 
are complimentary. Firms tend to increase the informativeness in response to a worsening 
information environment. This result is consistent with Balakrishman (2014) in which they find 
the management voluntary disclosure increases after a worsening information environment. Irani 
and Oesch (2013) finds a reduction of analyst coverage results in larger abnormal accruals, thus 
deteriorating the financial reporting quality. While Irani and Oesch (2013) concentrate on 
numeric content, as a complement to Irani and Oesch (2013), my paper shows the textual content 
becomes more informative after analyst coverage reduction. 
Textual content is the majority part of annual report. Increasing literature started to pay attention 
to textual content with increased computing power and language processing methodology. This 
paper sheds light on corporate disclosure policy in the textual content.  
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Appendix: 
The items that are included in the 10-K file 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Item 1 Business
Item 1A Risk Factors
Item 2 Properties
Item 3 Legal Proceeding
Item 5 Market for Registrant's Common Equity and Related Stockholder Matters
Item 6 Selected Financial Data
Item 7 Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations
Item 7A Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosure About Market Risk
Item 8 Financial Statements and Supplementary Data
Item 9 Changes in and Disagreements With Accountants on Accounting and Financial Disclosure
Item 9A Controls and Procedures
Item 10 Directors and Executive Officers of the Registrant
Item 11 Executive Compensation
Item 12 Security Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and Managerment 
Item 13 Certain Relationships and Related Transactions
Item 14 Principal Accountant Fees and Services
Items Required by SEC in 10-K
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Appendix: number of events in every year 
 
Year Broker Closure Broker M&A Number of events 
2000 4 2 6 
2001 7 3 10 
2002 4 1 5 
2003 2 0 2 
2004 2 0 2 
2005 4 3 7 
2006 1 1 2 
2007 3 3 6 
2008 1 2 3 
2009 0 3 3 
2010 1 0 1 
2011 0 1 1 
2012 2 2 4 
Total Events 52 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Variable Definiation 
Coverage
Arithemetic mean of the numbers of earnings forecasts for firm i from IBES 
summary file in fiscal year t
Score 1-cosine similarity between two documents,  adjusted by length
Length Natural logarithm of the number of words in that document
Fog
Readability measure developed by Robert Gunning.                                                                       
Fog=(words_per_sentence + percent_of_complex_words)* 0.4
IO Institutional ownership obtained from 13f
Lnasset Natural logarithm of firm i's book value of total assets
Leverage
Firm i's leverage ratio, defiend as book value of debt divided by book value of 
total assets in fiscal year t
ROA
Firm i’s profitability, measured by operating income before depreciation scaled by 
book value of asset 
R&Dassets Research and development expenditure (xrd) scaled by firm i’s total asset  
MB Firm i's market-to-book ratio during fiscal year t
Capex Capital expenditure scaled by book value of total assets
KZ index
Kaplan and Zingales index kz is computed as KZ= -1.002*cash flow - 
39.36*dividends - 1.315*cash holding +3.139* Leverage +0.283* Tobin’s Q
Tangibility Property, plant & equitpment divided by book value of total assets
Lnage
Natural logarithm of  firm i’s age, which is approximated by the number of years 
listed on Compustat
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Chapter 2: Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 
 
Table 1a: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables 25P Median Mean 75P Std N 
Similarity (10-
K) 0.746 0.809 0.800 0.862 0.079 53861 
Similarity 
(MD&A) 0.739 0.806 0.786 0.853 0.102 41350 
Similarity 
(Risk Factors) 0.878 0.922 0.901 0.952 0.079 21321 
Score (10-K) -0.058 -0.008 0.001 0.054 0.077 53861 
Score (MD&A) -0.059 -0.015 0.001 0.043 0.098 41350 
Score (Risk 
Factors) -0.053 -0.023 -0.003 0.021 0.079 21321 
Length (10-K) 10.346 10.712 10.716 11.080 0.590 53861 
Length 
(MD&A) 8.553 9.029 8.898 9.383 0.809 41350 
Length (Risk 
Factors) 8.254 8.732 8.670 9.136 0.677 21321 
Fog (10-K) 13.413 14.134 14.267 14.951 1.242 53861 
Fog (MD&A) 13.539 14.568 14.848 15.774 1.972 41350 
Fog (Risk 
Factors) 18.758 19.547 19.662 20.426 1.342 21321 
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Table 1b: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variables 25P Median Mean 75P Std N 
Coverage 2.091 4.750 7.021 9.667 6.618 53861 
LnAsset 4.930 6.195 6.308 7.549 1.916 53861 
Leverage 0.017 0.174 0.217 0.343 0.215 53861 
ROA 0.033 0.107 0.061 0.165 0.215 53861 
IO 0.320 0.568 0.545 0.770 0.274 53861 
R&DAssets 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.067 0.118 53861 
MB 1.103 1.505 2.045 2.317 1.575 53861 
CapexAssets 0.017 0.035 0.054 0.068 0.059 53861 
KZindex -7.534 -1.494 -8.311 0.716 20.393 53861 
Tangiblity 0.068 0.170 0.253 0.373 0.236 53861 
Lnage 2.079 2.639 2.699 3.296 0.762 53861 
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Chapter 2: Table 2 Baseline Regression 
 
Table 2 Baseline Regression 
Whole 10-K MD&A Section 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 Score Length Fog Score Length Fog 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Coverage -0.005*** -0.022*** -0.002 -0.009*** 0.008 -0.043 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.015) (0.001) (0.011) (0.028) 
LnAsset 0.008*** 0.107*** -0.065*** 0.016*** 0.098*** -0.108*** 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.018) (0.002) (0.012) (0.034) 
Leverage 0.015*** 0.224*** -0.015 0.015*** 0.138*** -0.372*** 
 (0.003) (0.022) (0.053) (0.005) (0.031) (0.091) 
ROA -0.020*** -0.208*** 0.055 -0.048*** -0.238*** -0.103 
 (0.003) (0.022) (0.050) (0.005) (0.030) (0.086) 
IO -0.003 0.015 0.032 -0.019*** -0.039 -0.010 
 (0.003) (0.021) (0.054) (0.005) (0.036) (0.100) 
R&DAsset -0.008 -0.031 -0.195* -0.023** -0.072 0.031 
 (0.009) (0.050) (0.110) (0.011) (0.064) (0.178) 
MB 0.002*** -0.003 0.010** 0.002*** -0.004 0.013 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) 
Capex 0.042*** 0.168** 0.510*** 0.021 0.168* -0.200 
 (0.010) (0.068) (0.174) (0.016) (0.091) (0.254) 
KZindex -0.000*** 0.000** -0.002*** -0.000 0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Tangibility -0.014** -0.111** 0.122 -0.009 -0.034 0.370** 
 (0.006) (0.045) (0.106) (0.010) (0.074) (0.187) 
Lnage 0.004* -0.088*** 0.087** 0.014*** -0.335*** 0.619*** 
 (0.002) (0.017) (0.043) (0.004) (0.038) (0.099) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 52488 52488 52488 40026 40026 40026 
 
 
58 
 
 
Chapter 2: Table 3 Regressions in 10-K 
 
 
Regressions in Whole 10-K 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pane A 
  Score Score Score Score Score 
Coverage 
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pane B 
  Length Length Length Length Length 
Coverage 
0.013** 0.013** -0.021*** -0.006 -0.022*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Pane C 
  Fog Fog Fog Fog Fog 
Coverage 
0.088*** 0.088*** -0.003 0.064*** -0.002 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes No Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes 
N 21321 21321 21321 21321 20483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
Chapter 2: Table 4 Regression in MD&A Section 
 
 
Regression in MD&A Section 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pane A 
  Score Score Score Score Score 
Coverage 
-0.005*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.009*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pane B 
  Length Length Length Length Length 
Coverage 
0.005 0.005 0.011 -0.014 0.008 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Pane C 
  Fog Fog Fog Fog Fog 
Coverage 
0.099*** 0.099*** -0.041 0.049* -0.043 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes No Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes 
N 41350 41350 41350 41350 40026 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
 
Chapter 2: Table 5 Regressions in Risk Factor Section 
 
Regression in Risk Factors Section 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pane A 
  Score Score Score Score Score 
Coverage 
-0.009*** -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.008*** -0.014*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Pane B 
  Length Length Length Length Length 
Coverage 
0.103*** 0.103*** -0.014 0.073*** -0.014 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) 
Pane C 
  Fog Fog Fog Fog Fog 
Coverage 
0.029 0.029 0.054** 0.019 0.052** 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028) (0.023) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes No Yes 
Firm FE No No Yes No Yes 
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes 
N 21321 21321 21321 21321 20483 
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Chapter 2: Table 6 Diff-in-Diff Analysis 10-K 
 
Diff-in-Diff in Whole 10-K 
Panel A                                                    Score Change 
  Treated Firms Control Group Diff-in-Diff  
  Before After Change Before After  Change Difference 
t 
value 
Overall 0.018 0.007 -0.011 0.018 0.006 -0.012 0.002*** 2.531 
Analyst 
coverage<10 0.013 0.005 -0.008 0.014 0.002 -0.012 0.004*** 3.532 
Analyst 
coverage>=10 0.021 0.009 -0.012 0.020 0.008 -0.012 0.000 0.310 
Panel B                                                 Length Change 
  Treated Firms Control Group Diff-in-Diff  
  Before After Change Before After  Change Difference 
t 
value 
Overall 10.763 10.900 0.137 10.774 10.890 0.116 0.021*** 4.268 
Analyst 
coverage<10 10.665 10.809 0.144 10.653 10.780 0.126 0.018** 2.375 
Analyst 
coverage>=10 10.824 10.956 0.132 10.848 10.958 0.110 0.022*** 3.557 
Panel C                                                   Fog Change 
  Treated Firms Control Group Diff-in-Diff  
  Before After Change Before After  Change Difference 
t 
value 
Overall 14.190 14.074 -0.116 14.206 14.081 -0.125 0.009 0.740 
Analyst 
coverage<10 14.203 14.053 -0.149 14.185 14.030 -0.155 0.006 0.319 
Analyst 
coverage>=10 14.183 14.087 -0.096 14.218 14.112 -0.107 0.011 0.686 
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Chapter 2: Table 7 Diff-in-Diff Analysis in MD&A Section 
Diff-in-Diff in MD&A Section 
Panel A                                                    Score Change 
  Treated Firms Control Group Diff-in-Diff  
  Before After Change Before After  Change Difference 
t 
value 
Overall 0.013 0.008 -0.005 0.017 0.007 -0.010 0.005*** 3.266 
Analyst 
coverage<10 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.010 0.008 -0.003 0.007*** 3.398 
Analyst 
coverage>=10 0.022 0.008 -0.013 0.022 0.006 -0.016 0.003 1.429 
Panel B                                                 Length Change 
  Treated Firms Control Group Diff-in-Diff  
  Before After Change Before After  Change Difference 
t 
value 
Overall 8.850 9.084 0.233 8.894 9.108 0.214 0.019** 2.278 
Analyst 
coverage<10 8.799 9.061 0.261 8.863 9.085 0.222 0.039*** 3.371 
Analyst 
coverage>=10 8.893 9.103 0.210 8.919 9.127 0.208 0.002 0.177 
Panel C                                                   Fog Change 
  Treated Firms Control Group Diff-in-Diff  
  Before After Change Before After  Change Difference 
t 
value 
Overall 15.01 14.80 -0.22 14.92 14.77 -0.15 -0.07*** -3.37 
Analyst 
coverage<10 14.79 14.55 -0.24 14.72 14.58 -0.14 -0.10*** -3.67 
Analyst 
coverage>=10 15.20 15.01 -0.19 15.08 14.92 -0.16 -0.03 -1.24 
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Chapter 2: Table 8 Diff-in-Diff Analysis in Risk Factor Section 
Diff-in-Diff in Risk Factors Section 
Panel A                                                    Score Change 
  Treated Firms Control Group Diff-in-Diff  
  Before After Change Before After  Change Difference 
t 
value 
Overall 0.010 0.012 0.002 0.010 0.009 -0.002 0.003* 1.835 
Analyst 
coverage<10 0.004 0.015 0.011 0.005 0.003 -0.002 0.012*** 4.048 
Analyst 
coverage>=10 0.014 0.010 -0.005 0.014 0.012 -0.002 -0.003 
-
1.192 
Panel B                                                 Length Change 
  Treated Firms Control Group Diff-in-Diff  
  Before After Change Before After  Change Difference 
t 
value 
Overall 8.452 8.624 0.171 8.456 8.618 0.162 0.009 1.282 
Analyst 
coverage<10 8.466 8.650 0.183 8.446 8.615 0.170 0.013 1.158 
Analyst 
coverage>=10 8.442 8.605 0.163 8.463 8.620 0.157 0.006 0.668 
Panel C                                                   Fog Change 
  Treated Firms Control Group Diff-in-Diff  
  Before After Change Before After  Change Difference 
t 
value 
Overall 19.90 19.79 -0.12 19.89 19.76 -0.13 0.014 0.78 
Analyst 
coverage<10 19.75 19.55 -0.20 19.72 19.59 -0.13 -0.063** -2.21 
Analyst 
coverage>=10 20.01 19.95 -0.06 20.01 19.88 -0.13 0.069*** 2.91 
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Chapter 2: Figure 1Year-by-year similarity in 10-K document 
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Chapter 2: Figure 2Time-series changes of modification Score, Length, and Fog index in 
10-K document 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Figure 3 The analyst coverage changes around the events 
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Figure 3. The analyst coverage changes around the events 
 (Treated-Control) 
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CHAPTER 3: Passive institutional investor and corporate innovation 
1.  Introduction 
Innovation plays an important role in the growth of individual firms and the development of 
overall economy. According to a report issued by OECD in 2015, innovation (including 
technological progress embodied in physical capital, investment in knowledge-based capital, 
increased multi-factor productivity growth, and creative destruction) accounts for approximately 
50% of a country’s GDP growth (He and Tian 2017). In this paper, we study the effect of passive 
institutional investors on corporate innovation. 
Institutional investors can affect a firm’s operation, either through their voice, which is a direct 
intervention (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Huddart 1993), or through the threat to exit, which is an 
indirect intervention (Admita and Pfleiderer 2009; Edmans 2009; Edmans and Manso 2011). In a 
direct intervention, institutions can influence firm governance and decisions by using their voting 
rights so that they can directly impact a firm’s operation. In an indirect intervention, institutions 
can sell their holdings if the firm does not perform well, thus exerting a threat to exit and pushing 
managers to perform in a good manner. For the relationship between institutional investors and 
innovation, Aghion, Reenen, and Zingales (2013) document that higher institutional ownership is 
associated with more innovation, and the underlying channel is through reducing managerial 
career risks. In their study, they find that quasi-indexers, or passive institutional investors, have 
no effect on innovation. In contrast, He and Tian (2013) show that firms covered by a larger 
number of analysts generate fewer patents and patents with lower impact, and they attribute the 
negative effects to non-dedicated institutional investors. In addition, Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) 
find that an increase in liquidity causes a reduction in future innovation, and they argue that 
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quasi-indexers who use passive indexing strategies have little or no incentive to monitor, thus 
leading to lower innovative activity. Hence the evidence in the literature shows that passive 
institutional investors have no or negative impact on innovation. In this paper, by applying the 
Russell 1000 and 2000 Index reconstruction, we find that an increase in passive institutional 
investors contributes to more innovation, in both the quantity of patents and in the quality of 
patents. 
At the end of May each year, Russell Investments ranks all U.S. firms based on their market 
capitalization; then, the first one thousand firms are included in the Russell 1000 index, while the 
next two thousand firms fall in the Russell 2000 index. Firms around the 1000th rank have very 
close market capitalization; however, because their market capitalization ranks on the last trading 
day in May, they fall into different indices. Since the Russell index is value weighted, the top 
firms in the Russell 2000 have much higher relative weights than the bottom firms in the Russell 
1000. In addition, while the Russell 1000 total market cap is more than 10 times larger than the 
Russell 2000 total market cap, the total dollar amount which includes both passive and active 
investors for the Russell 1000 is about half compared to the total dollar amount benchmarked to 
the Russell 2000. Therefore, top firms in the Russell 2000 receive a greater dollar amount 
compared to bottom firms in the Russell 1000 (Chang, Hong, and Liskovich 2015). Since firms 
cannot control small variations in market cap, index assignment near the threshold is as good as 
random. This random assignment leads to a significant difference in index weights around the 
threshold, and the sharp difference in index weights around the cutoff point drives an exogenous 
variation in quasi-indexer ownership. By applying this index reconstruction setting, we can test 
the causality between quasi-indexers and innovation. 6 
                                                     
Several studies have employed the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff to analyze the price effect of addition and deletion from 
the Russell index (Chang, Hong, and Liskovich 2015), the association between institutional holding and payout 
71 
 
  
We find that the Russell 2000 index inclusion drives a discontinuity in quasi-indexers ownership: 
top firms in the Russell 2000 have around 8% more quasi-indexers than bottom firms in the 
Russell 1000. Using the predicated quasi-indexer ownership to test the impact on innovation, our 
results show that an exogenous increase in quasi-indexers leads to an increase in firm innovation 
in both the number of patents and citations.  
To explore the underlying mechanisms, we find that quasi-indexers reduce the CEO turnover 
probability, and this mitigates CEO career concerns and allows them to do more innovation. We 
also find that quasi-indexers pay more attention to relative performance. If a firm’s performance 
is below the industry median, the CEO is more likely to be fired if there are more passive 
institutional investors. In addition, we find that an increase in passive institutional investor 
ownership leads to more non-executive granted options, and employee options contribute to 
more innovation. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating the positive effect of passive 
institutional investors on corporate innovation. We also provide possible explanations for the 
mechanism as to why passive institutional investors contribute to innovation. 
2. Data and Russell index background  
2.1 Sample  
The sample includes firms in the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 from years 1995 to 2006, since 
after that there is a banding rule which introduces noise to the identification. In that case, it is not 
                                                                                                                                                                           
policy (Crane, Michenaud, and Weston 2016), managerial disclosure (Boone and White 2015), acquisition and CEO 
power (Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2016), monitoring incentives (Fich, Harford,and Tran 2015), and the effect of 
passive investors on firm governance (Appel, Gormley, and Keim 2016; Appel, Gormley, and Keim 2017).   
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clear whether it is because of the introduced noise that causes the results, so we keep the sample 
to year 2006. We obtain the index membership data from Bloomberg, then merge it with firm 
characteristics data from Compustat, institutional ownership data from Thomson Reuters 13F 
filing, and security market data from CRSP. The institutional investor types are from Bushee and 
Noe (2000) and Bushee (2001). We obtain innovation data from NBER and Leonid Kogan, 
Dimitris Papanikolaou, Amit Seru, and Noah Stoffman (KPSS) patent data. The patent data is 
collected through 2010 to mitigate the truncation issue. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the whole sample. On average, institutional holdings 
account for 61% percent of firm’s total outstanding shares, the median is even higher, around 
64%. We can see institutional investor is really an important participant in the financial market. 
When separate institutional investors based on their investment horizon and portfolio 
diversification (Bushee and Noe 2000; Bushee 2001), it can be divided into dedicated investors 
(long horizon, concentrated portfolio), quasi-indexers (long horizon, diversified portfolio), and 
transient investors (short horizon and diversified portfolio). Most of institutional holdings are 
from quasi indexer, which account for 38% of firms’ total shares outstanding. Transient investors 
account for 15% while dedicated investors account for 8%. For firm innovation activity, the total 
number of patent applied and granted for each firm in each year is around 17.5, and for each 
patent, the number of citation is around 3.17 per year. We can find that for firms around the 25 
percentile and the median, the patent number and citation per patent are zero, which indicates 
that innovation activity are versatile and mainly concentrated in some firms. For other firm 
characteristics, which includes size, market to book, return on assets, KZ index, leverage, firm 
age, R&D input, and Tobin’s Q, are consistent with prior literature. These variables are used as 
control variables in the analysis. Firm characteristics are described in detail in the Appendix.  
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2.2 Russell index background 
During June each year, FTSE Russell ranks all U.S. firms based on their market capitalization on 
the last trading day in May. As Figure 1 shows, the first 1000 constitute the Russell 1000 index 
and the subsequent 2000 firms go to the Russell 2000. Rank zero means the cutoff point which is 
the 1000th rank. At the end of June each year, Russell Investments publishes the new index list 
and the financial market will follow the new list from the next trading day till June of the 
following year. The market cap is calculated by multiplying the closing price on the last trading 
day in May and the total common shares outstanding. When there are more than two classes of 
shares, Russell will use the share price of classes with the largest number of float shares.  
   For firms around the 1000th rank which is the cutoff point to determine the index 
membership, there is a fundamental reason to expect a sharp change in institutional ownership. 
As Figure 1 shows, firms around the threshold have comparable market caps, since firms cannot 
control small variations in market capitalization on a determined day, the assignment to different 
indexes is as good as random. In addition, Russell index is value weighted, so top firms in the 
Russell 2000, who are the largest firms in the Russell 2000, receives much higher weights 
compared to the bottom firms in the Russell 1000, who are the smallest firms in the Russell 
1000. Figure 2 plots the index weight and the market cap rank for firms in the Russell 1000 and 
Russell 2000 around ±500 bandwidths from the cutoff point. We can see top firms in the Russell 
2000 (rank from 0 to 500) receive much higher weight compared to the bottom firms in the 
Russell 1000 (rank from -500 to 0). And as it is closer to the cutoff points, the difference 
becomes even larger.  
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The Russell indexes attract a large amount of investments. According to Russell Investments’ 
2008 U.S. Equity Indexes: Institutional Benchmark Survey, the number of products 
benchmarked to the Russell 2000 is about 2/3 compared to the number benchmarked to the S&P 
500; the dollar amount is about 1/7 compared to that of the S&P 500; and the ratios are 
increasing over time. The Russell 1000 index firm total market cap is around 10 times that of the 
Russell 2000; however, the Russell 1000 attracts only half the total dollar amount compared to 
dollars invested in the Russell 2000 index, and there are two to three times more dollars 
passively tracking the Russell 1000 than the Russell 2000. Since the Russell Index is value-
weighted, top firms in the Russell 2000 have much higher weights than bottom firms in the 
Russell 1000. In addition, more dollars are invested in the Russell 2000, so the top firms in the 
Russell 2000 receive a greater dollar amount compared to the bottom Russell 1000 firms. The 
institutional holding for top firms in the Russell 2000 is correspondingly much higher than for 
bottom firms in the Russell 1000. Figure 3 presents quasi-indexers’ ownership for firms around 
the threshold when bandwidth equals ±500. The figure indicates that there is a significant 
variation in institutional ownership for firms around the cutoff point: firms at top of the Russell 
2000 have around 8% more institutional holdings compared to the bottom firms in the Russell 
1000. Closer to the cutoff point, the difference is even larger. This evidence shows that the 
random assignment into difference indexes leads to a sharp difference in index weight and a 
subsequent exogenous change in institutional holdings.   
   Since Russell Investment uses its proprietary data to calculate the market cap, which 
cannot be exactly identified by CRSP and Compustat, I use the actual assignment instead of the 
end of May market cap as the instrument for institutional holding in order to capture the 
relationship more precisely. In addition, after 2007, Russell introduced a “banding” rule to 
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maintain consistency for index constitution. Under this new rule, only if a firm’s market cap 
change is big enough, can it switch to the other index; otherwise, the firm will still stay in its 
current index, which leads to a stickiness in index membership. To be more specific, firms are 
ranked in a descending order based on their end of May market caps, and a cumulative market 
cap is calculated for each firm. Then, the cumulative market cap is divided by total market cap of 
all Russell 3000E firms to get the market cap ratio for each firm. Based on this market cap ratio, 
a firm will jump into the other index only if its market cap ratio is more than ±2.5% away 
compared to the 1000th firm market cap ratio. We can tell this banding rule reduces the turnover 
for index constitution. To validate the random assignment, I study the effect up to year 2006. 
 
3. Identification and methodology 
For firms around the 1000th rank but been assigned to different indexes, they have very close 
market capitalization, so the assignment is as good as random. However, since Russell index is 
value weighted, so top firms in the Russell 2000 have much higher index weights as they are the 
largest firms in the index, and bottom firms in the Russell 1000 have much lower weight as they 
are the smallest firm in the Russell 1000. Since market cap ratio for the Russell 1000 and the 
Russell 2000 is around 10:1, and the ratio of dollar amounts that passively tracking the Russell 
1000 and the Russell 2000 is 2:1, the top firms in Russell 2000 receive more dollar passively 
tracking the firm than bottom firms in the Russell 1000, which lead to an exogenous variation in 
the quasi-indexer ownership. 
To identify the causal relation between quasi-indexer and innovation, we implement the 
regression discontinuity design with the 2SLS model as follows: 
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𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1)           
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑖?̂? + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡   (2) 
   The first stage regression equation (1) is based on regression discontinuity design, we use 
Russell2000, which indicates whether the firm belongs to the Russell 2000, as the instrument for 
quasi-indexer ownership. The underlying assumption is: for firms around the index threshold that 
have been assigned to the Russell 2000 instead of the Russell 1000, there is an exogenous 
variation in institutional holdings, especially for quasi-indexers; and whether the firm belongs to 
Russell 2000 is not directly correlated with innovation. 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) is a function based on a firm’s 
market cap rank which includes (Rank-1000), and Russell2000*(Rank-1000), to account for the 
distance to the index threshold. FloatAdj is the proxy for Russell index float adjustment, 
computed as the difference between end of May market cap rank and the actual rank assigned by 
Russell Investments in June. By including this variable, we also control the variation in index 
weight caused by Russell Investments’ adjustment on float shares. X stands for firm 
characteristics which includes size, market to book, return on assets, KZ index, leverage, firm 
age, R&D input, and Tobin’s Q, in addition to transient investor ownership.  
   In the second stage regression equation (2), we use the instrumented QIX obtained from 
the first stage to test the causal effect on firm innovation activity. Patent number per year and 
citation per patent are used to capture the innovation activity. We apply both current year 
innovation and year t+3 innovation activity since it may take times for quasi-indexers to exert 
their influence. We also control for Rank*, FloatAdj, and firm characteristics including size, 
market to book, return on assets, KZ index, leverage, firm age, R&D input, and Tobin’s Q, 
transient ownership, same as with the first stage’s controls. In addition, both stages include year 
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and industry fixed effect, also clustered by firm.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 OLS regression of quasi-indexers’ impact on innovation 
We first run the OLS regression to test the relation between quasi-indexer and innovation 
activity. Table 2 shows the results. Columns 1 and 2 use patent number in current year and year 
t+3 as the dependent variable to measure the innovation quantity, and columns 3 and 4 use 
citation per patent in current year and year t+3 as the dependent variable to measure the 
innovation quality. We can see the coefficient for quasi-indexer has mixed results. For current 
year patent number, there is negative insignificant result, while for patent number in year t+3, 
there is significant relation between quasi-indexer and innovation. When it comes to CitePat, 
which is the innovation quality, there is insignificant and positive effect. From the results we can 
see, based on OLS regression, the relation between quasi-indexer and innovation is not clear, in 
addition the endogeneity concern exists. From the results on dedicated investor, there is positive 
effect on innovation, which is consistent with Aghion et al. (2013).  
4.2 Institutional holdings around the index threshold 
Since firms around the index threshold have comparable market caps and Russell index is value 
weighted, top firms in the Russell 2000 have much higher weights than bottom firms in the 
Russell 1000. So, for each dollar invested in the index, top firms in the Russell 2000 receive 
much more dollar compared to the bottom firms in the Russell 1000. Figure 3 shows this 
discontinuity around the cutoff point: top firms in the Russell 2000 have higher quasi-indexers’ 
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holdings than bottom firms in the Russell 1000 and as it is closer to the threshold, the difference 
becomes larger.  
In this part, we first identify whether the inclusion in Russell 2000 index can lead to a difference 
in institutional holdings, especially the quasi-indexers’ holding, and test whether this exogenous 
variation in quasi-indexer has causal effect on firm innovation. Applying equation (1) regression, 
we test whether firms belong to the Russell 2000 have an exogenous change in institutional 
holdings. Then we separate institutional holdings into dedicated investor, quasi-indexer, and 
transient investors based on their investment horizon and portfolio concentration according to 
Bushee classification. 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) is a function based on firm end of May market cap rank which 
includes (Rank-1000), and Russell2000*(Rank-1000), to account for the distance to the index 
threshold. FloatAdj is the proxy for Russell index float adjustment, computed as the different 
between end of May market cap rank and the actual rank assigned by Russell Investments in 
June. X stands for firm characteristics which include size, market-to-book, return on assets, and 
leverage.  
For the institutional investors’ type, it is from Bushee and Noe (2000) and Bushee (2001). The 
classification is based on investment diversification and turnover. Dedicated investors have long 
horizon holdings in a small number of firms. Quasi- indexers have long term investments in 
diversified firms. And transient investors have high portfolio turnover in diversified firms. So 
dedicated investors do not benchmark the index membership, instead, they cherry pick up the 
stocks. In contrast, quasi indexers and transient investors have diversified portfolio, that’s the 
main reason we can find an exogenous change in their holdings for top firms in the Russell 2000 
compared to bottom firms in the Russell 1000.  
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Table 3 shows the results for different types of institutional investors. Panel A represents the 
results when the bandwidth is ±300 while the panel B shows the results when bandwidth equals 
±500. Column 1 is for total institutional ownership while the next three columns are for 
dedicated investors, quasi-indexers, and transient investors, respectively. From panel A, we can 
see in the first column there is an exogenous difference in institutional holding for firms around 
the cutoff: top firms in the Russell 2000 on average have 18% more institutional holdings 
compare to bottom firms in the Russell 1000, and it is statistically significant. Most of the 
difference comes from quasi-indexers: we can see from column 3, top firms in the Russell 2000 
has around 10% more quasi-indexers than bottoms firms in the Russell 1000. There is no 
significant difference in dedicated investor from column 2 results. From column 4, we can see 
there is also an exogenous change in transient investors: firms in top the Russell 2000 have 7% 
more transient investor holdings compared to bottom firms in the Russell 1000. Since there is a 
significant change in transient investors, in the IV regression, we also control for transient 
investors’ ownership to mitigate the concern from transient investors’ impact.  
Next, we repeat the same regression for bandwidth equals ±500, as presented in panel B. We can 
find the inclusion in the Russell 2000 leads to a difference in institutional holdings: firms in top 
Russell 2000 have 14% more institutional ownership compared to bottom firms in the Russell 
1000. Similar to the results in panel A, most of the difference comes from quasi indexers and 
transient investors, which account for 8% and 5% of the difference respectively. And for 
dedicated investors, there is no significant effect. As the bandwidth becomes larger, the 
magnitude becomes smaller since the difference in index weighs also becomes smaller. Figure 2 
and Figure 3 can further explain the underlying reason: as it is closer to the threshold, the 
difference of index weights between top firms in the Russell 2000 and bottom firms in the 
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Russell 1000 are even larger, therefore the difference of institutional holdings also becomes 
larger; and when it goes far from the threshold, the difference of index weights between the two 
groups becomes smaller and the changes in institutional holdings also are smaller. Since in this 
paper we want to explore the passive investor’s impact on firm innovation, in the following 
analysis, we will concentrate on the quasi-indexers’ ownership. 
4.3 The quasi-indexer effect on innovation 
In this part, we test when there is an exogenous increase in quasi-indexer ownership, what’s the 
impact on firm innovation. Table 4 shows the two stage least square regression based on 
equation (1) and (2) when the dependent variable is patent number. Columns 1 and 3 are for 
bandwidth equals ±500 and columns 2 and 4 are for bandwidth equals ±300. Dependent variable 
for columns 1 and 2 is current year patent number, for columns 3 and 4 is the patent number in 
year t+3. We use ln (1+patent numbert+j) as the dependent variable to adjust for skewness issue. 
From the first stage results, we can see the inclusion in the Russell 2000 leads to a 7% increase in 
quasi-indexers’ ownership when the bandwidth is ±500, and an 8% increase when the bandwidth 
is ±300.  
From the second stage, in which using the predicted quasi-indexers’ ownership obtained 
from the first stage to test its effect on patent number, we can see there is significant positive 
relation between quasi-indexers and patent number. From columns 1 and 2, we can find when the 
quasi-indexer increases, current year patent number also increases, both for window equals ±500 
and for window equals ±300. From columns 3 and column 4 we can find the positive effect 
consistent in year t+3: when quasi-indexers’ ownership increases in current year, it leads to an 
increase in the patent number in year t+3. From these results we can see quasi-indexers have a 
positive impact on firm’s patent number, both in current year and future period.  
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For innovation activity, patent number is the patent applied and granted in each year, so it 
measures the patent quantity. In addition, the quality of patent is also important—whether the 
patent is the widely cited and contribute to other innovative activity. So, in next part, we test 
whether the increase in quasi-indexers influences innovation quality. To measure innovation 
quality, we use the citation divided by patent which measures the average citation for each 
patent. Then we take natural log of (1+CitePat) as the dependent variable for innovation quality. 
Table 5 shows the results on CitePat. In the first stage, the inclusion in the Russell 2000 leads to 
a 7% increase in quasi-indexer when the bandwidth is ±500 and an 8% increase when the 
bandwidth is ±300. In the second stage, when we have a look at the coefficient of predicted 
quasi-indexer ownership, we can find there is a positive impact on patent citation. From columns 
1 and 2 we can see, the increase in quasi-indexer ownership leads to an increase in citation per 
patent, for both window sizes. From columns 3 and 4, we can find quasi-indexers also have 
influence on year t+3 CitePat, which indicates an increase in quasi-indexers’ ownership can lead 
to higher innovation quality in the future years.  
From the results in Table 4 and Table 5, we can see the increase in passive investor have a 
positive impact on firm innovation activity, both the quantity and quality of the patent. When 
there are more quasi-indexers in a firm, they affect the firm to do more innovation—obtain more 
patent and have more high-quality patent. Although quasi-indexers are passive investors to some 
extent, they still care about firms’ operation and affect firms’ decisions.  
 
5. The underlying mechanisms and possible explanations 
In this section, we investigate the mechanism that quasi-indexers increase corporate 
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innovation. Three potential channels could contribute to this positive casual effect. First of all, 
Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) showed that although quasi-indexers are passive investors, 
they are not passive owners. Better corporate governance owned to quasi-indexer could be one 
channel increasing corporate innovation quantity as well as quality. In addition, we examined 
whether the existence of quasi-indexer alleviate CEO’s concern. Our results suggest that CEOs’ 
turnover probability will be lower with larger quasi-indexer. In the end, we tested whether larger 
proportion of quasi-indexer ownership improve non-executive employee stock option grant. Fu, 
Low, and Zhang (2015) found a positive effect of non-executive employee stock options on the 
quantity and quality of innovation outcomes. Our test shows that quasi-indexers play positive 
roles in this channel by enhancing non-executive employees’ stock option. Overall, we provide 
these three channels that could be the underlying mechanism through which quasi-indexer 
improve corporate innovation. 
5.1 Quasi-indexer and corporate governance 
Using the same Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes setting, Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) shows 
how passive institutional investor influence firms’ governance choices. Through their large 
voting blocs, quasi-indexers increase firms’ independent directors and oppose takeover 
provision. These two effects have been proved quite critical for firms’ innovation. On one hand, 
Balsmeier, Fleming, and Manso (2017) showed that firms that transition to independent boards 
focus on more crowded and familiar areas of technology. They patent and claim more and 
receive more total future citations to their patents. On the other hand, by comparing firms in 
states which pass antitakeover laws versus those firms located in states without antitakeover 
laws. Atanassov (2013) find this exogenous reduction in the threat of hostile takeovers dampen 
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firms’ innovation production not only in quantity but also in quality.  In sum, both increased 
independent directors and alleviated takeover provision caused by quasi-indexers can improve 
firms’ innovation have been well documented by prior literature. 
5.2 Quasi-indexer and CEO turnover 
In this part, we study the role played by quasi-indexer in managerial turnover. CEO turnover data 
come from Execucomp from 1995 to 2015. Stock returns are collected from CRSP. The 
dependent variable equals to one if CEO changed in year t+1. The summary statistics of CEO 
turnover and stock yearly return can be found in table 6. Year return is firm i’s stock cumulative 
year per fiscal year which is negatively correlated with CEO turnover as expected. Compared 
with Aghion, Reenen, and Zingales (2013), in which they showed insignificant correlation 
between institutional ownership with managerial forced turnover, we find the proportion of 
equity owned by quasi-indexer significantly reduce the probability of CEO turnover. 
Indiosycratic median is defined as the difference between firm i’s yearly return and industry 
median yearly return and indiosycratic mean is defined as the difference between firm i’s yearly 
return and industry average yearly return.  Instead of overall firm’s stock performance, these two 
measures are capturing firm i’s relative performance compared to industry mean/median. Colum 
2 and column 3 indicate that interaction of quasi-indexer ownership and these two measures are 
both negative and significant. This is another piece of evidence that quasi-indexers are passive 
investors but not passive owners. They do not take it for granted and only focus on the level of 
stock return but also care the relative performance considering the industry situation.   
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5.3 Quasi-indexer and non-executive employee stock option 
The last channel we propose is that quasi-indexers improve corporate innovation by 
enhancing non-executive employees’ incentive to innovate. Non-executive employees are the 
direct inventors in innovation activities. Their salary and work satisfaction are essential in 
innovation process. For example, Chang, Change, Fu, Low, and Zhang (2015) find a positive 
effect of non-executive employee stock options on the quantity and quality of innovation 
outcomes. Liu, Mao, and Tian (2017) showed human capital fixed effect can explain a majority 
of the variation in innovation performance compared to firm fixed effect.  
Chen, Hong, and Lin (2018) use Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes discontinuity studying the 
correlation between quasi-indexer ownership and corporate social responsibility. They found 
increased quasi-indexer equity ownership improve firms’ community, diversity, employee 
relation, environment and product. In our study, we test whether more quasi-index ownership 
improve non-executive employees’ option grant. Non-executive employees’ option data is 
collected from Execucomp between 1995 and 2006. Three dependent variables are used 
including non-executive option percentage, non-executive option value and non-executive option 
number. The results are showed in Table 8. 
All of these three regressions indicate that the existence of quasi-indexer enhance firms’ 
stock option granted to non-executive employees. Specifically, one standard deviation change in 
quasi-indexer ownership increase the option percent granted to non-executive employee by 
0.7%. Column 2 and column3 change the dependent variable to next year’s non-executive 
employee option value and total option number. These positive significant coefficients indicate 
that quasi-indexers increase the total number of option granted to non-executive employees as 
well as the value of those options. 
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6. Conclusion  
Institutional investors are important equity investors in United States and quasi-indexers are 
the main composition among institutional investors. Prior literatures showed mixed evidence 
about the role played by quasi-indexers in corporate innovation. This paper provide evidence that 
the quasi-indexers help enhance corporate innovation. 
By exploiting variation in ownership around Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes, we find the 
exogenous increment of passive institutional investors due to the Russel index assignments result 
in increased future patent output as well as patent quality. This result complements the finding by 
Aghion, Reenen, and Zingales (2013) which only find the positive effect by dedicated 
institutional investor.  
Our study also contributes to the increased studies on passive institutional investors on firms’ 
investment and governance. We show that quasi-indexers are more perceptive when they 
evaluate CEO’s performance by emphasizing the relative performance rather than pure luck. The 
evidence that quasi-indexer can enhance the option granted to non-executive employees is also 
showed in this paper. Better employee satisfaction is one potential channel we proposed for 
passive institutional investors improve corporate innovation. 
This study unveils the influence by passive institutional investors on corporate decision. 
There could be more channels for passive institutional investors to alleviate managers’ concern 
and encourage riskier investment. Besides, the non-executive effects brought by passive 
investors except non-executive employees’ option grant, require further study. 
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Appendix 
IO Institutional ownership obtained from 13f 
DED The proportion of dedicated institutional investor holdings based on 
Bushee classification.  
QIX The proportion of quasi-indexer institutional investor holdings based 
on Bushee classification. 
TRA The proportion of transient institutional investor holdings based on 
Bushee classification. 
Russell2000 
(R2000) 
A dummy indicates whether firm belongs to the Russell 2000. If the 
firm is in Russell 2000, the dummy equals one; if the firm is in 
Russell 1000, the dummy equals zero.  
Rank* Firm’s rank based on end of May market capitalization. 
FloatAdj Firm end of May market cap rank minus end of June assigned rank. 
CEO turnover A dummy variable indicates whether there is CEO change in the 
current year. We obtain the CEO relevant data from Compustat then 
identify whether current year CEO is same as last year CEO. If it is 
different, the dummy equals 1; otherwise, the dummy equals zero.  
Year return Cumulate monthly stock return to annual stock return based on each 
fiscal year. The data is obtained from CRSP.  
Industry median The industry median year return based on first two digits SIC code.  
Idiosyncratic median The difference between firm year return and industry median return. 
Industry mean The industry average year return based on first two digits SIC code. 
Idiosyncratic mean The difference between firm year return and industry average return. 
Non-executive 
percentage 
The proportion of option granted to non-executive employees. We 
obtain executive’s percentage of total option granted to employees 
(pcttotopt) from Compustat, then subtract executive part from 100% 
to get non-executive proportion of option granted.     
Non-executive option 
value 
The value of non-executive employee’s option based on Black-
Scholes model (blkshval).  
Non-executive option 
number 
The number of non-executive employee’s option (numsecur) 
KZindex Kaplan and Zingales index kz is computed as KZ= -1.002*cash flow - 
39.36*dividends - 1.315*cash holding +3.139* Leverage +0.283* 
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Tobin’s Q 
Age Number of years of firm i’s existed on Compustat 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 Natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s patents that filed and eventually 
granted in year t+j 
𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 Natural logarithm of one plus firm i’s citation per patent that filed and 
eventually granted in year t+j 
R&DAsset Research and development expenditure (xrd) scaled by firm i’s total 
asset   
ROA Firm i’s profitability, measured by operating income before 
depreciation scaled by book value of asset  
Tobin’s Q Firm i’s Tobin’s Q, measured by book value of asset minus book 
value of equity plus market value of equity minus balance sheet 
deferred taxes, divided by book value of asset  
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Chapter 3: Figure 1 Russell index market cap 
This figure plots the relation between firm market cap and corresponding end of May market cap ranking. 
The first 1000 firms go to the Russell 1000 and the subsequent 2000 firms go to the Russell 2000. The 
vertical line corresponds to firm market cap at the end of May. Rank in horizontal line indicates the 
distance to index threshold. Zero means the 1000th rank, which is the threshold for the index assignment. 
Negative numbers are for firms in the Russell 1000, and positive numbers are for firms in the Russell 
2000.   
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Chapter 3: Figure 2 Russell index weight 
This figure plots the relation between firm index weight and its market cap rank around threshold. The 
vertical line is the index weight in percentage and horizontal line is the distance to the threshold based on 
market cap rank. Zero means the 1000th rank, which is the threshold for index assignment. Negative 
numbers are for firms in the Russell 1000, and positive numbers are for firms in the Russell 2000.   
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Chapter 3: Figure 3 Russell index and quasi-indexer ownership 
This figure plots the relation between institutional ownership and firm market cap rank around the 
threshold. The vertical line is firm institutional holding in real number and horizontal line is the market 
cap rank. Rank indicates the distance to threshold. Zero means the 1000th rank, which is the threshold for 
index assignment. Negative numbers are for firms in the Russell 1000, and positive numbers are for firms 
in the Russell 2000.   
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Chapter 3: Table 1 Summary statistics 
This panel reports summary statistics of institutional holding innovation measures, and firm 
characteristics for firms in the Russell 1000 and the Russell 2000 from 1995 to 2006. The table shows 
each variable’s mean, standard deviation, 25 percentile value, median, and 75 percentile value. Variables 
are defined in Appendix. All variables are winsorized at 1% levels.  
 
 
 Mean Std. Dev p25 Median p75 
Total IO 0.61 0.24 0.43 0.64 0.80 
Dedicated 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.12 
Quasi indexer 0.38 0.18 0.25 0.38 0.50 
Transient 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.21 
Patent  17.47 118.48 0.00 0.00 3.00 
Cite/Pat 3.17 11.66 0.00 0.00 1.38 
Size 6.91 1.63 5.75 6.74 7.89 
ROA 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.18 
KZindex -7.09 15.78 -6.98 -1.54 0.29 
Leverage 0.22 0.20 0.04 0.20 0.35 
Ln(Age) 2.73 0.82 2.08 2.64 3.50 
R&DAsset  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tobin’s Q 2.19 2.12 1.17 1.58 2.42 
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Chapter 3: Table 2 Panel regression for institutional investors effects on innovation 
This table presents panel regression that regresses innovation measure on different types of institutional 
investor: quasi-indexer, dedicated investor, transient investors, in addition to firm characteristics and year, 
firm fixed effects. Column 1 shows the regression for innovation patent. Column 2 shows result for patent 
number in year t+3. Column 3 and 4 represent the results for CitePat in year t and year t+3. Coefficients 
are scaled by variable standard deviation and reported with t statistics in parentheses. Variables are 
defined in Appendix. ***, ** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using two-tailed 
test.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 lnpat lnpat3 lncitepat lncitepat3 
QIXm9 -0.000541 0.149*** 0.0142 0.0207 
 (-0.02) (4.10) (0.28) (0.51) 
DEDm9 0.0854* 0.101* 0.0917 0.113* 
 (1.71) (1.88) (1.23) (1.88) 
TRAm9 -0.0835** 0.127*** 0.109* 0.236*** 
 (-2.20) (3.07) (1.92) (5.12) 
Size 0.185*** 0.110*** 0.134*** 0.0549*** 
 (20.14) (11.11) (9.76) (4.96) 
KZindex 0.00116*** 0.000187 -0.00328*** -0.00213*** 
 (2.92) (0.43) (-5.50) (-4.40) 
Leverage -0.122*** -0.164*** -0.224*** -0.192*** 
 (-3.80) (-4.65) (-4.65) (-4.90) 
Ln(age) 0.0191 0.112*** 0.0332 0.100*** 
 (0.91) (4.95) (1.06) (3.98) 
R&DAsset 2.415*** 6.476*** 17.78*** 16.94*** 
 (3.02) (7.26) (14.82) (16.95) 
Tobin’s Q 0.00176 0.0226*** 0.0343*** 0.00905*** 
 (0.90) (10.57) (11.67) (3.80) 
Firm FE Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Year FE Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
N 26895 24821 26895 24528 
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Chapter 3: Table 3 Difference in institutional ownership around Russell index threshold 
This table shows the difference in institutional ownership for firms belong to different indexes around the 
index threshold. It represents the first stage estimation and divides institutional holdings into dedicated, 
quasi indexer and transient based on Bushee classification: 
𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
where Russell2000 is a dummy which indicates whether the firm is included in Russell 2000. The 
regression includes year and industry fixed effects. Table A shows the results when window size is ±300, 
and table B represents the results when window size is ±500. Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
reported with t statistics in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix.  ***, ** and* indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using two-tailed test.  
 
A. bandwidth is ±300 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Institutional 
ownership 
Dedicated 
ownership 
Quasi indexer Transient 
ownership 
D 0.18*** 0.01 0.10*** 0.07*** 
 (11.43) (1.34) (8.76) (9.81) 
Rank -0.0003*** -0.00001 -0.0001** -0.0002*** 
 (-4.68) (-0.31) (-2.45) (-6.38) 
Rank*D -0.0002*** -0.00002 -0.0002*** -0.00002 
 (-3.00) (-0.46) (-3.85) (-0.62) 
Float adj 0.0007*** 0.00005 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (11.89) (1.48) (8.94) (11.56) 
_cons 0.33*** -0.1 0.19*** 0.22*** 
 (4.25) (-1.63) (3.04) (5.53) 
N 5862 5804 5862 5860 
 
B. bandwidth is ±500 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Institutional 
ownership 
Dedicated 
ownership 
Quasi indexer Transient 
ownership 
D 0.14*** 0.009 0.08*** 0.05*** 
 (12.06) (1.51) (9.70) (8.95) 
Rankm5 -0.0002*** -0.00001 -0.0001*** -0.00007*** 
 (-5.43) (-0.42) (-3.51) (-4.81) 
Rankm5*D -0.0001*** -0.00002 -0.00004 -0.00005*** 
 (-3.09) (-0.92) (-1.49) (-3.08) 
Float adj 0.0005*** 0.00004* 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (13.54) (1.76) (9.77) (14.15) 
_cons 0.39*** -0.03 0.16*** 0.24*** 
 (6.61) (-0.54) (2.78) (6.72) 
N 9845 9747 9845 9842 
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Chapter 3: Table 4 Quasi-indexer’s impact on firm patent: IV estimates 
This table represents the two-stage instrumental variable regression based on the equations as below: first 
stage uses whether firm is belonging to Russell 2000 as an instrument to predict institutional ownership: 
𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  
The second stage regression use the predicted QIX obtained in first stage to test the effects on insider 
trading behavior: 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑖?̂? + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡.  
Dependent variable patent number is based on firm level. All results are estimated using ranks implied 
end of May firms’ market capitalization within the assigned index as of the index assignment date. 
Column 1 and 3 are for window size equals ±500, and column 2 and 4 are for window size equals ±300. 
Control variables are suppressed for brevity. Both stages include year and industry fixed effect. Standard 
errors are clustered by firm and reported with t statistics in parentheses. Variables are defined in 
Appendix. ***, ** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using two-tailed test.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ±500 ±300 ±500 ±300 
First stage Quasi Indexer 
Russell2000 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 
 (9.12) (7.81) (8.51) (7.32) 
Second stage Ln(Pat) Ln(Pat) Ln(Pat3) Ln(Pat3) 
𝑄𝐼?̂? 1.64** 2.41*** 2.18*** 2.70*** 
 (2.36) (2.85) (3.40) (3.45) 
Rank -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-6.17) (-3.56) (-5.65) (-3.39) 
Rank*R2000 0.0004** 0.002 0.0003* 0.0002 
 (2.12) (0.65) (1.95) (0.82) 
FloatAdj 0.0003** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
 (2.10) (1.21) (1.26) (0.62) 
Xit Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
N 9760 5828 9760 5828 
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Chapter 3: Table 5 Institutional ownership effects on innovation citation: IV estimates 
This table represents the two-stage instrumental variable regression based on the equations as below: first 
stage uses whether firm is belonging to Russell 2000 as an instrument to predict institutional ownership: 
𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿0𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙2000𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛿1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  
The second stage regression use the predicted QIX obtained in first stage to test the effects on insider 
trading behavior: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑄𝐼𝑋𝑖?̂? + 𝑔(𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
∗ ) + 𝛾1𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡.  
Dependent variable CitePat is based on firm level. All results are estimated using ranks implied end of 
May firms’ market capitalization within the assigned index as of the index assignment date. Column 1 
and 3 are for window size equals ±500, and column 2 and 4 are for window size equals ±300. Control 
variables are suppressed for brevity. Both stages include year and industry fixed effect. Standard errors 
are clustered by firm and reported with t statistics in parentheses. Variables are defined in Appendix. ***, 
** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using two-tailed test. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ±500 ±300 ±500 ±300 
First stage Quasi Indexer 
Russell2000 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 
 (9.12) (7.81) (8.51) (7.32) 
Second stage Ln(CitePat) Ln(CitePat) Ln(CitePat3) Ln(CitePat3) 
𝑄𝐼?̂? 0.92* 2.19*** 0.98** 1.49*** 
 (1.65) (3.01) (2.29) (2.75) 
Rank -0.0004*** -0.001*** -0.0003*** -0.0005*** 
 (-3.89) (-3.30) (-4.24) (-3.35) 
Rank*R2000 0.0002* 0.0004 0.0002* 0.0003 
 (1.70) (1.61) (1.68) (1.57) 
FloatAdj 0.00001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.00001 
 (0.11) (-1.10) (0.96) (-0.09) 
Xit Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
N 9760 5828 9760 5828 
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Chapter 3: Table 6 
This panel reports summary statistics of CEO turnover, employee option granted data, institutional 
holding, and firm characteristics. CEO turnover, institutional holding and firm characteristics are from 
1995 to 2015. Option granted data are from 1995 to 2006 because of data availability. The table shows 
each variable’s mean, standard deviation, 25 percentile value, median, and 75 percentile value. Variables 
are defined in Appendix. All variables are winsorized at 1% levels.  
 
 Mean Std. Dev p25 Median p75 
CEO turnover 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Non-executive percentage 69.83 27.62 59.64 74.63 85.72 
Non-executive option value 52824.21 583576.80 2101.30 6759.98 22719.10 
Non-executive option number 3760.76 38672.66 277.52 715.08 2011.94 
Quasi indexer 0.49 0.17 0.38 0.50 0.61 
Year return 0.16 0.52 -0.14 0.10 0.36 
Size 7.48 1.69 6.25 7.34 8.59 
ROA 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.20 
KZindex 0.75 1.13 0.15 0.81 1.45 
Leverage 0.21 0.18 0.05 0.20 0.34 
Ln(Age) 3.06 0.71 2.56 3.09 3.69 
R&DAsset  0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Tobin’s Q 1.91 1.37 1.10 1.46 2.16 
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Chapter 3: Table 7 The relation between quasi-indexer and CEO turnover 
This table shows the logit regression of quasi-indexer’s effect on CEO turnover. Dependent variable is the 
next period CEO turnover. Industry median is the industry median return in that year, and idiosyncratic 
median is the difference between firm year return and industry medina return. Industry mean is the 
industry average return in that year, and idiosyncratic mean is the difference between firm year return and 
industry mean return. t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. Control variables are defined in 
Appendix.  ***, ** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using two-tailed test. 
 f (CEO turnover) 
QIX -0.386*** -0.380*** -0.426*** 
 (-2.99) (-2.93) (-3.25) 
Year return -0.507*** -0.314*** -0.321*** 
 (-10.38) (-2.97) (-3.03) 
QIX*industry median  0.267  
  (0.89)  
QIX*idiosyncratic median  -0.555**  
  (-2.33)  
QIX*industry mean   0.116 
   (0.41) 
QIX*idiosyncratic mean   -0.523** 
   (-2.21) 
Size 0.0293** 0.0307** 0.0304** 
 (2.00) (2.10) (2.08) 
ROA -1.412*** -1.419*** -1.423*** 
 (-7.03) (-7.09) (-7.10) 
KZindex 0.0170 0.0177 0.0172 
 (0.68) (0.71) (0.68) 
Leverage -0.0544 -0.0620 -0.0578 
 (-0.32) (-0.37) (-0.34) 
Ln(age) 0.0741** 0.0725** 0.0724** 
 (2.28) (2.23) (2.23) 
R&D/Asset -1.113*** -1.114*** -1.112*** 
 (-2.80) (-2.80) (-2.80) 
Tobin’s Q -0.00358 -0.00401 -0.00382 
 (-0.18) (-0.20) (-0.19) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 29175 29175 29175 
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Chapter 3: Table 8 The relation between quasi-indexer and no-executive option granted 
This table shows the panel regression of quasi-indexer’s effect on non-executive option granted. 
Dependent variable is the next period non-executive option percentage, non-executive option granted 
value, non-executive option granted number. For option value and option number, it is in ln(1+f.option 
value) and ln(1+f.option number). t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. Control variables are defined 
in Appendix.  ***, ** and* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using two-tailed test. 
 
 
 f (non-executive 
percent) 
f (non-executive option 
value) 
f (non-executive option 
number) 
QIX 4.158** 0.528*** 0.261** 
 (1.97) (3.45) (2.10) 
Size 4.313*** 0.643*** 0.423*** 
 (8.58) (17.66) (14.30) 
ROA 0.621 1.034*** -0.0923 
 (0.27) (6.29) (-0.69) 
KZindex -0.148 -0.0156 -0.0260 
 (-0.35) (-0.50) (-1.03) 
Leverage -3.371 -0.720*** -0.0480 
 (-1.23) (-3.64) (-0.30) 
Ln(age) -3.615** -0.798*** -0.373*** 
 (-2.28) (-6.94) (-3.99) 
R&D/Asset 0.602 0.685* 0.0114 
 (0.12) (1.89) (0.04) 
Tobin’s Q 0.815*** 0.191*** 0.0674*** 
 (4.05) (13.08) (5.69) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 10394 10341 10355 
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